Benaloh-Tuinstra协议的窃国学弱点

2006 International Conference on Systems and Networks Communications (ICSNC'06) Pub Date : 2006-10-29 DOI:10.1109/ICSNC.2006.50

Piotr Borzecki, J. Kabarowski, Przemyslaw Kubiak, Mirosław Kutyłowski, Filip Zagórski

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引用次数: 3

摘要

在加密协议的设计过程中，它们的参与者通常被识别为它们使用的软件或硬件。然而，这些支持工具没有在协议级别进行验证。这种粗心大意为盗窃(SETUP)攻击打开了大门。在本文中，我们设计了这样一个攻击经典的Benaloh-Tuinstra选举协议。本文开发的技术工具之一是Diffie-Hellman SETUP攻击的新变体，其中攻击者不知道组的克罗内克分解。这种情况在Goldwasser-Micali密码系统中尤为明显。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Kleptographic Weaknesses in Benaloh-Tuinstra Protocol

During designing of cryptographic protocols, their participants are usually identified with software or hardware they use. However, these supporting tools are not verified at the protocol level. Such carelessness opens the door to kleptographic (SETUP) attacks. In this paper we design such an attack on the classical Benaloh-Tuinstra election protocol. One of the technical tools developed in the paper is a new variant of a Diffie-Hellman SETUP attack, in which Kronecker Decomposition of the group is not known to the attacker. This is especially the case of Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.

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2006 International Conference on Systems and Networks Communications (ICSNC'06)

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