内部威胁域的决策支持程序

J. P. Murphy, V. Berk, Ian D. Gregorio-De Souza
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引用次数: 8

摘要

在复杂的组织中有效地缓解内部威胁不是简单的“发了就忘了”的问题。需要彻底的例程来最大限度地减少未被发现的恶意内部人员的机会。虽然检测策略违规和已知不良行为的签名对于更广泛的威胁缓解战略至关重要,但很明显,基于行为的测量(包括异常检测和社交网络分析)对于检测具有合法网络和数据访问权限的精通技术的恶意用户至关重要。由于用户可能会显示大量潜在的恶意行为,因此检测的主要任务落在能够将这些行为关联起来的分析师手中。基于我们的BANDIT系统,我们提供了一个10步分析程序,它提供了一个常识性的方法来限制恶意可信用户可能造成的损害。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Decision Support Procedure in the Insider Threat Domain
Effective mitigation of the Insider Threat in complex organizations is not simply a matter of 'fire-and-forget'. Thorough routines are required to minimize the chances of malicious insiders going undetected. While detecting policy violations and signatures of known-bad behavior are essential to a broader threat mitigation strategy, it is clear that behavior-based measurements, including anomaly detection and social network analysis, will be crucial to detecting technically savvy malicious users with legitimate network and data access. Due to the large number of potentially malicious behaviors users may display, the main thrust of detection falls in the hands of an analyst capable of correlating these behaviors. Based on our BANDIT system, we offer a 10-step analyst program, which offers a common-sense approach to limiting the damage a malicious trusted user can achieve.
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