延伸与模糊:对道德边界的两种截然不同的态度

M. Kumasaka
{"title":"延伸与模糊:对道德边界的两种截然不同的态度","authors":"M. Kumasaka","doi":"10.15057/25390","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"At the dawn of environmental philosophy, Asian thought, especially Japanese thought, was expected to be a plentiful source of inspiration to improve the relationship between human beings and nature. However, the influence of Asian thought upon environmental philosophy seems to be very limited, or remains superficial. Concepts and theories in this field are almost all Western, while genuine Asian concepts and theories hardly appear outside studies about particular Asian cases. This paper compares the modern, Western, environmental mind and the natural thought found in Japanese culture. Through this comparison, we see the characteristics of both more clearly, in terms of advantages and limitations. To this end, this paper, firstly, analyzes the concept of anthropocentrism, secondly, shows how Western environmentalism attempts to overcome anthropocentrism, and thirdly, considers anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism in Japanese culture. I. Three Types of Anthropocentrism Criticism and defense of anthropocentrism frequently appear in studies of environmental philosophy. Some researchers have become wearied by repeated disputes about anthropocentrism and turned their attention to more practical fields. Environmental pragmatists in particular “resist the dominant trend to homogenize environmental philosophy” and “cannot tolerate theoretical delays to the contribution that philosophy may make to environmental questions.” Indeed, it is unclear how philosophic researchers can contribute toward the solution of environmental issues. This paper does not aim for the homogenization of environmental philosophy, either. However, for the further development of comparative environmental philosophy, analyzing the concept of anthropocentrism more precisely has great significance. This task might not contribute toward policy making directly, but it could better clarify our view on our relationships with nature. 1. Anthropocentrism I and Non-anthropocentrism I There are three types of anthropocentrism: The first type, anthropocentrism, means that Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 44 (2012), pp.21-33. C Hitotsubashi University * Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotubashi University, Japan. Email: kumasaka.motohiro@gmail.com 1 Andrew Light and Eric Katz, “Introduction: Environmental Pragmatism and Environmental Ethics as Contested Terrain,” in Environmental Pragmatism, ed. Andrew Light and Eric Katz (London: Routledge, 1996), 4. the world is made for human beings or exists to be used by human beings. In the epochmaking essay “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Lynn White Jr. stated that this kind of anthropocentrism in Christianity is the underlying cause of the modern environmental crisis. Non-anthropocentrism regards the world as made not only for human beings but also for other beings, or existing for no reason. Anthropocentrism might be regarded as a religious anthropocentrism. 2. Anthropocentrism II and Non-anthropocentrism II In the studies of applied ethics, principally in environmental ethics, the second type of anthropocentrism is typically used. Anthropocentrism is an ethical type of anthropocentrism. In the framework of anthropocentrism, only human beings are moral objects. Non-human beings are not granted membership of the moral community; humans have responsibility “for” nature, but not “to” nature. In other words, non-human beings have instrumental, but not intrinsic value. Although legal systems can be extremely anthropocentric, and theoretically a perfectly non-anthropocentric society could exist, it is difficult to imagine an individual or a group that behaves either totally anthropocentrically or totally non-anthropocentrically. 3. Anthropocentrism III and Non-anthropocentrism III Anthropocentrism is also an ethical concept, or more precisely speaking, a meta-ethical and axiological concept. This idea claims that the source of values lies in the valuations of valuers, namely human beings. Anthropocentrism is used in this paper as a synonym of subjectivism. Non-anthropocentrism is the idea that there are values that exist independently of individual judgment. The arguments about this type of anthropocentrism have a close relationship with the arguments about the concept of intrinsic value. Anthropocentrism might be confused with the attitude that regards nature as having only instrumental value for human beings, but this would be an incorrect association. To acknowledge human beings as the source of all values does not necessarily require one to regard nature only as natural resources, nor does it hinder one from admitting the intrinsic value of nature. Even for anthropocentrists, it is obvious that water is valuable for animals and plants, even if those animals and plants are totally useless species for human beings and for the stability of local and global ecosystems. Filthy soil can be harmful to human health, but at the same time, it is an indispensable habitat for many types of organisms. In nature, there are certainly values relevant for other beings, but not for humans. However, we can think about the values for non-human beings only if we comprehend what is valuable for them through scientific research, reasoning, and empathy. If there are values we cannot recognize at all, no HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [December 22 2 See, Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155 (March 1967): 1203-07. 3 Passmore made the difference between “responsibility for nature” and “responsibility to nature.” See, John Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1980), xii. 4 Intrinsic value also has several meanings and is a very confusing concept. In this paper, intrinsic value is always used as a non-instrumental value. For further analysis of the concept of intrinsic value, see, John OʼNeil, Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-being and the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993), 8-25; Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 71-80. matter how valuable they are, they will not merit our consideration. Value does not have to be for human beings, but it has to be understandable for human beings. Every value we can consider has its source in the value systems of human beings in this sense. In other words, the idea of anthropocentrism cannot consider values beyond human understanding, although it does not deny the possibility that the existence of a non-instrumental value of nature can be proved in an understandable way for humans. Therefore, the concept of non-instrumental values is compatible with anthropocentrism. Non-anthropocentrism is the idea that there are values in nature beyond our understanding that we should protect or promote. For example, if you want to protect nature principally and primarily for the sake of Godʼs will, regardless of whether we fully understand why it is valuable, your attitude can be called non-anthropocentric . Contrary to the case of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, anthropocentrism is compatible with secular environmental thought, while non-anthropocentrism might be regarded as a religious belief. As mentioned above, anthropocentrism does not mean that one must regard nature only as natural resources, nor does it mean one is hindered from admitting the intrinsic value of nature in theory, but it is still not easy for anthropocentrists to identify the intrinsic value of nature. Intrinsic value is usually expected to be defined as value that is independent from the interest of human beings, but it is a difficult task to define such value without a neutral observer beyond human beings. We will return to this problem later. Now, we have seen three types of anthropocentrism and the correspondent types of nonanthropocentrism above. Each type of anthropocentrism can be combined with other types of anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism. In the following sections, we will take a general view of Western environmentalism and Japanese natural thought, and consider how both are constructed. There are a number of theories in environmental philosophy. The character of Japanese culture also varies depending on the region and the time period. Furthermore, Japanese culture is a blend of several religions and philosophies, e.g. Buddhism, Confucianism, Shinto, Taoism, and other local cultures. Their attitudes to nature vary greatly. If we simplify Western environmental philosophy and Japanese culture down to two monotone units, or arbitrarily choose some of their features when we make comparisons between them, we will miss the richness in both and the meaning of the comparison will be diminished. However, through the analysis of the anthropocentrisms/non-anthropocentrisms that they contain, we can see there are remarkable differences between the Western environmental mind and Japanese natural thought regarding the human-nature relationship. II. Extension: The Western Strategy to Overcome Anthropocentrism Although Western environmentalism varies widely, most environmental theories and practices seem to consist of non-anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, aside from stewardship, which consists of anthropocentrism and anthropocentrism . Most Western environmentalists deny that the world is made for human beings, and claim that certain or all beings are moral objects in their own right. Another common element seen in much Western environmental thought is the frequent mention of “extension” or its synonyms. As Lynn White pointed out, mainstream Christianity, which is one of the foundations of Western culture, EXTENSION AND OBFUSCATION: TWO CONTRASTING ATTITUDES TO THE MORAL BOUNDARY 2012] 23","PeriodicalId":335834,"journal":{"name":"Hitotsubashi journal of social studies","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"EXTENSION AND OBFUSCATION: TWO CONTRASTING ATTITUDES TO THE MORAL BOUNDARY\",\"authors\":\"M. Kumasaka\",\"doi\":\"10.15057/25390\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"At the dawn of environmental philosophy, Asian thought, especially Japanese thought, was expected to be a plentiful source of inspiration to improve the relationship between human beings and nature. However, the influence of Asian thought upon environmental philosophy seems to be very limited, or remains superficial. Concepts and theories in this field are almost all Western, while genuine Asian concepts and theories hardly appear outside studies about particular Asian cases. This paper compares the modern, Western, environmental mind and the natural thought found in Japanese culture. Through this comparison, we see the characteristics of both more clearly, in terms of advantages and limitations. To this end, this paper, firstly, analyzes the concept of anthropocentrism, secondly, shows how Western environmentalism attempts to overcome anthropocentrism, and thirdly, considers anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism in Japanese culture. I. Three Types of Anthropocentrism Criticism and defense of anthropocentrism frequently appear in studies of environmental philosophy. Some researchers have become wearied by repeated disputes about anthropocentrism and turned their attention to more practical fields. Environmental pragmatists in particular “resist the dominant trend to homogenize environmental philosophy” and “cannot tolerate theoretical delays to the contribution that philosophy may make to environmental questions.” Indeed, it is unclear how philosophic researchers can contribute toward the solution of environmental issues. This paper does not aim for the homogenization of environmental philosophy, either. However, for the further development of comparative environmental philosophy, analyzing the concept of anthropocentrism more precisely has great significance. This task might not contribute toward policy making directly, but it could better clarify our view on our relationships with nature. 1. Anthropocentrism I and Non-anthropocentrism I There are three types of anthropocentrism: The first type, anthropocentrism, means that Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 44 (2012), pp.21-33. C Hitotsubashi University * Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotubashi University, Japan. Email: kumasaka.motohiro@gmail.com 1 Andrew Light and Eric Katz, “Introduction: Environmental Pragmatism and Environmental Ethics as Contested Terrain,” in Environmental Pragmatism, ed. Andrew Light and Eric Katz (London: Routledge, 1996), 4. the world is made for human beings or exists to be used by human beings. In the epochmaking essay “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Lynn White Jr. stated that this kind of anthropocentrism in Christianity is the underlying cause of the modern environmental crisis. Non-anthropocentrism regards the world as made not only for human beings but also for other beings, or existing for no reason. Anthropocentrism might be regarded as a religious anthropocentrism. 2. Anthropocentrism II and Non-anthropocentrism II In the studies of applied ethics, principally in environmental ethics, the second type of anthropocentrism is typically used. Anthropocentrism is an ethical type of anthropocentrism. In the framework of anthropocentrism, only human beings are moral objects. Non-human beings are not granted membership of the moral community; humans have responsibility “for” nature, but not “to” nature. In other words, non-human beings have instrumental, but not intrinsic value. Although legal systems can be extremely anthropocentric, and theoretically a perfectly non-anthropocentric society could exist, it is difficult to imagine an individual or a group that behaves either totally anthropocentrically or totally non-anthropocentrically. 3. Anthropocentrism III and Non-anthropocentrism III Anthropocentrism is also an ethical concept, or more precisely speaking, a meta-ethical and axiological concept. This idea claims that the source of values lies in the valuations of valuers, namely human beings. Anthropocentrism is used in this paper as a synonym of subjectivism. Non-anthropocentrism is the idea that there are values that exist independently of individual judgment. The arguments about this type of anthropocentrism have a close relationship with the arguments about the concept of intrinsic value. Anthropocentrism might be confused with the attitude that regards nature as having only instrumental value for human beings, but this would be an incorrect association. To acknowledge human beings as the source of all values does not necessarily require one to regard nature only as natural resources, nor does it hinder one from admitting the intrinsic value of nature. Even for anthropocentrists, it is obvious that water is valuable for animals and plants, even if those animals and plants are totally useless species for human beings and for the stability of local and global ecosystems. Filthy soil can be harmful to human health, but at the same time, it is an indispensable habitat for many types of organisms. In nature, there are certainly values relevant for other beings, but not for humans. However, we can think about the values for non-human beings only if we comprehend what is valuable for them through scientific research, reasoning, and empathy. If there are values we cannot recognize at all, no HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [December 22 2 See, Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155 (March 1967): 1203-07. 3 Passmore made the difference between “responsibility for nature” and “responsibility to nature.” See, John Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1980), xii. 4 Intrinsic value also has several meanings and is a very confusing concept. In this paper, intrinsic value is always used as a non-instrumental value. For further analysis of the concept of intrinsic value, see, John OʼNeil, Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-being and the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993), 8-25; Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 71-80. matter how valuable they are, they will not merit our consideration. Value does not have to be for human beings, but it has to be understandable for human beings. Every value we can consider has its source in the value systems of human beings in this sense. In other words, the idea of anthropocentrism cannot consider values beyond human understanding, although it does not deny the possibility that the existence of a non-instrumental value of nature can be proved in an understandable way for humans. Therefore, the concept of non-instrumental values is compatible with anthropocentrism. Non-anthropocentrism is the idea that there are values in nature beyond our understanding that we should protect or promote. For example, if you want to protect nature principally and primarily for the sake of Godʼs will, regardless of whether we fully understand why it is valuable, your attitude can be called non-anthropocentric . Contrary to the case of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, anthropocentrism is compatible with secular environmental thought, while non-anthropocentrism might be regarded as a religious belief. As mentioned above, anthropocentrism does not mean that one must regard nature only as natural resources, nor does it mean one is hindered from admitting the intrinsic value of nature in theory, but it is still not easy for anthropocentrists to identify the intrinsic value of nature. Intrinsic value is usually expected to be defined as value that is independent from the interest of human beings, but it is a difficult task to define such value without a neutral observer beyond human beings. We will return to this problem later. Now, we have seen three types of anthropocentrism and the correspondent types of nonanthropocentrism above. Each type of anthropocentrism can be combined with other types of anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism. In the following sections, we will take a general view of Western environmentalism and Japanese natural thought, and consider how both are constructed. There are a number of theories in environmental philosophy. The character of Japanese culture also varies depending on the region and the time period. Furthermore, Japanese culture is a blend of several religions and philosophies, e.g. Buddhism, Confucianism, Shinto, Taoism, and other local cultures. Their attitudes to nature vary greatly. If we simplify Western environmental philosophy and Japanese culture down to two monotone units, or arbitrarily choose some of their features when we make comparisons between them, we will miss the richness in both and the meaning of the comparison will be diminished. However, through the analysis of the anthropocentrisms/non-anthropocentrisms that they contain, we can see there are remarkable differences between the Western environmental mind and Japanese natural thought regarding the human-nature relationship. II. Extension: The Western Strategy to Overcome Anthropocentrism Although Western environmentalism varies widely, most environmental theories and practices seem to consist of non-anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, aside from stewardship, which consists of anthropocentrism and anthropocentrism . Most Western environmentalists deny that the world is made for human beings, and claim that certain or all beings are moral objects in their own right. Another common element seen in much Western environmental thought is the frequent mention of “extension” or its synonyms. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

肮脏的土壤可能对人体健康有害,但与此同时,它是许多生物不可缺少的栖息地。在自然界中,肯定有与其他生物相关的价值观,但与人类无关。然而,只有当我们通过科学研究、推理和同理心理解什么对非人类有价值时,我们才能思考它们的价值。如果存在我们根本无法认识的价值,就没有HITOTSUBASHI社会研究杂志[12月22日]。参见,Lynn White Jr.,“我们生态危机的历史根源”,Science 155(1967年3月):1203-07。帕斯莫尔区分了“对自然的责任”和“对自然的责任”。参见约翰·帕斯莫尔:《人对自然的责任、生态问题与西方传统》,第2版(伦敦:达克沃斯出版社,1980),第12页。内在价值也有几个含义,是一个非常令人困惑的概念。在本文中,内在价值总是作为一种非工具价值来使用。关于内在价值概念的进一步分析,见约翰·奥尼尔:《生态、政策与政治:人类福祉与自然世界》(伦敦:Routledge出版社,1993),第8-25页;保罗·w·泰勒,《尊重自然:一种环境伦理学理论》(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社,1986),第71-80页。不管它们多么有价值,都不值得我们考虑。价值不一定是为人类而存在的,但它必须为人类所理解。在这个意义上,我们所能考虑的每一种价值都源于人类的价值体系。换句话说,人类中心主义的思想不能考虑超出人类理解的价值,尽管它并不否认以人类可以理解的方式证明自然的非工具价值存在的可能性。因此,非工具价值的概念与人类中心主义是相容的。非人类中心主义认为,自然界中存在着我们无法理解的价值,我们应该保护或促进这些价值。例如,如果你想保护自然,主要是为了上帝的意志,而不管我们是否完全理解它的价值,你的态度可以被称为非人类中心主义。与人类中心主义和非人类中心主义的情况相反,人类中心主义与世俗的环境思想是相容的,而非人类中心主义可能被视为一种宗教信仰。如上所述,人类中心主义并不意味着必须只把自然视为自然资源,也不意味着在理论上不承认自然的内在价值,但人类中心主义者仍然不容易识别自然的内在价值。人们通常期望将内在价值定义为独立于人类利益之外的价值,但如果没有人类之外的中立观察者,就很难对这种价值进行定义。我们稍后再讨论这个问题。现在,我们已经看到了三种类型的人类中心主义和相应类型的非人类中心主义。每种类型的人类中心主义都可以与其他类型的人类中心主义或非人类中心主义相结合。在接下来的章节中,我们将对西方的环境保护主义和日本的自然思想做一个概览,并考虑两者是如何构建的。在环境哲学中有许多理论。日本文化的特点也因地区和时期的不同而不同。此外,日本文化融合了几种宗教和哲学,如佛教、儒家、神道教、道教和其他地方文化。他们对自然的态度差别很大。如果我们将西方环境哲学和日本文化简化为两个单调的单位,或者在比较时随意选择它们的某些特征,我们就会错过两者的丰富性,也会减少比较的意义。然而,通过对它们所包含的人类中心主义/非人类中心主义的分析,我们可以看到西方环境思想与日本自然思想在人与自然关系上存在着显著的差异。2虽然西方的环境保护主义差异很大,但大多数环境理论和实践似乎都包括非人类中心主义和非人类中心主义,除了由人类中心主义和人类中心主义组成的管理之外。大多数西方环保主义者否认世界是为人类而造的,并声称某些人或所有人都有自己的道德对象。在许多西方环境思想中看到的另一个共同因素是经常提到“扩展”或其同义词。正如Lynn White所指出的,作为西方文化基础之一的主流基督教,延伸与模糊:对道德边界的两种截然不同的态度[2012]
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
EXTENSION AND OBFUSCATION: TWO CONTRASTING ATTITUDES TO THE MORAL BOUNDARY
At the dawn of environmental philosophy, Asian thought, especially Japanese thought, was expected to be a plentiful source of inspiration to improve the relationship between human beings and nature. However, the influence of Asian thought upon environmental philosophy seems to be very limited, or remains superficial. Concepts and theories in this field are almost all Western, while genuine Asian concepts and theories hardly appear outside studies about particular Asian cases. This paper compares the modern, Western, environmental mind and the natural thought found in Japanese culture. Through this comparison, we see the characteristics of both more clearly, in terms of advantages and limitations. To this end, this paper, firstly, analyzes the concept of anthropocentrism, secondly, shows how Western environmentalism attempts to overcome anthropocentrism, and thirdly, considers anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism in Japanese culture. I. Three Types of Anthropocentrism Criticism and defense of anthropocentrism frequently appear in studies of environmental philosophy. Some researchers have become wearied by repeated disputes about anthropocentrism and turned their attention to more practical fields. Environmental pragmatists in particular “resist the dominant trend to homogenize environmental philosophy” and “cannot tolerate theoretical delays to the contribution that philosophy may make to environmental questions.” Indeed, it is unclear how philosophic researchers can contribute toward the solution of environmental issues. This paper does not aim for the homogenization of environmental philosophy, either. However, for the further development of comparative environmental philosophy, analyzing the concept of anthropocentrism more precisely has great significance. This task might not contribute toward policy making directly, but it could better clarify our view on our relationships with nature. 1. Anthropocentrism I and Non-anthropocentrism I There are three types of anthropocentrism: The first type, anthropocentrism, means that Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 44 (2012), pp.21-33. C Hitotsubashi University * Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotubashi University, Japan. Email: kumasaka.motohiro@gmail.com 1 Andrew Light and Eric Katz, “Introduction: Environmental Pragmatism and Environmental Ethics as Contested Terrain,” in Environmental Pragmatism, ed. Andrew Light and Eric Katz (London: Routledge, 1996), 4. the world is made for human beings or exists to be used by human beings. In the epochmaking essay “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Lynn White Jr. stated that this kind of anthropocentrism in Christianity is the underlying cause of the modern environmental crisis. Non-anthropocentrism regards the world as made not only for human beings but also for other beings, or existing for no reason. Anthropocentrism might be regarded as a religious anthropocentrism. 2. Anthropocentrism II and Non-anthropocentrism II In the studies of applied ethics, principally in environmental ethics, the second type of anthropocentrism is typically used. Anthropocentrism is an ethical type of anthropocentrism. In the framework of anthropocentrism, only human beings are moral objects. Non-human beings are not granted membership of the moral community; humans have responsibility “for” nature, but not “to” nature. In other words, non-human beings have instrumental, but not intrinsic value. Although legal systems can be extremely anthropocentric, and theoretically a perfectly non-anthropocentric society could exist, it is difficult to imagine an individual or a group that behaves either totally anthropocentrically or totally non-anthropocentrically. 3. Anthropocentrism III and Non-anthropocentrism III Anthropocentrism is also an ethical concept, or more precisely speaking, a meta-ethical and axiological concept. This idea claims that the source of values lies in the valuations of valuers, namely human beings. Anthropocentrism is used in this paper as a synonym of subjectivism. Non-anthropocentrism is the idea that there are values that exist independently of individual judgment. The arguments about this type of anthropocentrism have a close relationship with the arguments about the concept of intrinsic value. Anthropocentrism might be confused with the attitude that regards nature as having only instrumental value for human beings, but this would be an incorrect association. To acknowledge human beings as the source of all values does not necessarily require one to regard nature only as natural resources, nor does it hinder one from admitting the intrinsic value of nature. Even for anthropocentrists, it is obvious that water is valuable for animals and plants, even if those animals and plants are totally useless species for human beings and for the stability of local and global ecosystems. Filthy soil can be harmful to human health, but at the same time, it is an indispensable habitat for many types of organisms. In nature, there are certainly values relevant for other beings, but not for humans. However, we can think about the values for non-human beings only if we comprehend what is valuable for them through scientific research, reasoning, and empathy. If there are values we cannot recognize at all, no HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [December 22 2 See, Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155 (March 1967): 1203-07. 3 Passmore made the difference between “responsibility for nature” and “responsibility to nature.” See, John Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1980), xii. 4 Intrinsic value also has several meanings and is a very confusing concept. In this paper, intrinsic value is always used as a non-instrumental value. For further analysis of the concept of intrinsic value, see, John OʼNeil, Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-being and the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993), 8-25; Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 71-80. matter how valuable they are, they will not merit our consideration. Value does not have to be for human beings, but it has to be understandable for human beings. Every value we can consider has its source in the value systems of human beings in this sense. In other words, the idea of anthropocentrism cannot consider values beyond human understanding, although it does not deny the possibility that the existence of a non-instrumental value of nature can be proved in an understandable way for humans. Therefore, the concept of non-instrumental values is compatible with anthropocentrism. Non-anthropocentrism is the idea that there are values in nature beyond our understanding that we should protect or promote. For example, if you want to protect nature principally and primarily for the sake of Godʼs will, regardless of whether we fully understand why it is valuable, your attitude can be called non-anthropocentric . Contrary to the case of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, anthropocentrism is compatible with secular environmental thought, while non-anthropocentrism might be regarded as a religious belief. As mentioned above, anthropocentrism does not mean that one must regard nature only as natural resources, nor does it mean one is hindered from admitting the intrinsic value of nature in theory, but it is still not easy for anthropocentrists to identify the intrinsic value of nature. Intrinsic value is usually expected to be defined as value that is independent from the interest of human beings, but it is a difficult task to define such value without a neutral observer beyond human beings. We will return to this problem later. Now, we have seen three types of anthropocentrism and the correspondent types of nonanthropocentrism above. Each type of anthropocentrism can be combined with other types of anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism. In the following sections, we will take a general view of Western environmentalism and Japanese natural thought, and consider how both are constructed. There are a number of theories in environmental philosophy. The character of Japanese culture also varies depending on the region and the time period. Furthermore, Japanese culture is a blend of several religions and philosophies, e.g. Buddhism, Confucianism, Shinto, Taoism, and other local cultures. Their attitudes to nature vary greatly. If we simplify Western environmental philosophy and Japanese culture down to two monotone units, or arbitrarily choose some of their features when we make comparisons between them, we will miss the richness in both and the meaning of the comparison will be diminished. However, through the analysis of the anthropocentrisms/non-anthropocentrisms that they contain, we can see there are remarkable differences between the Western environmental mind and Japanese natural thought regarding the human-nature relationship. II. Extension: The Western Strategy to Overcome Anthropocentrism Although Western environmentalism varies widely, most environmental theories and practices seem to consist of non-anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, aside from stewardship, which consists of anthropocentrism and anthropocentrism . Most Western environmentalists deny that the world is made for human beings, and claim that certain or all beings are moral objects in their own right. Another common element seen in much Western environmental thought is the frequent mention of “extension” or its synonyms. As Lynn White pointed out, mainstream Christianity, which is one of the foundations of Western culture, EXTENSION AND OBFUSCATION: TWO CONTRASTING ATTITUDES TO THE MORAL BOUNDARY 2012] 23
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