{"title":"贸易战:好而且容易赢吗?","authors":"Karen Jackson, Oleksandr Shepotylo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3230668","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the welfare implications of the current US protectionist non-cooperative trade policy and potential responses by the EU and China. Using a structural gravity approach, we evaluate three retaliatory scenarios. Our estimates suggest that the impact of this trade war on the US is negative in all policy scenarios, ranging from 0.25 to 1.4 percent of GDP, with the lower range of welfare losses when the EU or/and China do not retaliate. Therefore, it is a dominant strategy for both China and the EU to keep tariffs against US goods at current levels.","PeriodicalId":391101,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: International Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Trade Wars: Are Good and Easy to Win?\",\"authors\":\"Karen Jackson, Oleksandr Shepotylo\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3230668\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper explores the welfare implications of the current US protectionist non-cooperative trade policy and potential responses by the EU and China. Using a structural gravity approach, we evaluate three retaliatory scenarios. Our estimates suggest that the impact of this trade war on the US is negative in all policy scenarios, ranging from 0.25 to 1.4 percent of GDP, with the lower range of welfare losses when the EU or/and China do not retaliate. Therefore, it is a dominant strategy for both China and the EU to keep tariffs against US goods at current levels.\",\"PeriodicalId\":391101,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Econometric Modeling: International Economics eJournal\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-08-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Econometric Modeling: International Economics eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230668\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometric Modeling: International Economics eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230668","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the welfare implications of the current US protectionist non-cooperative trade policy and potential responses by the EU and China. Using a structural gravity approach, we evaluate three retaliatory scenarios. Our estimates suggest that the impact of this trade war on the US is negative in all policy scenarios, ranging from 0.25 to 1.4 percent of GDP, with the lower range of welfare losses when the EU or/and China do not retaliate. Therefore, it is a dominant strategy for both China and the EU to keep tariffs against US goods at current levels.
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