{"title":"最高法院关于支持自由企业基金诉上市公司会计监督委员会一案上诉人的法律教授之友摘要,第08-861号","authors":"Donna M. Nagy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1443971","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A group of corporate and securities law professors submitted this brief as amici curiae to the United States Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Amici support Congress’s decision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to establish a new regulator to oversee the auditors of public companies. But amici express concern that the particular design chosen by Congress accords the PCAOB substantial discretion and autonomy without imposing constitutionally sufficient accountability. Specifically, the brief argues that the PCAOB's structure is unconstitutional because it violates the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. With a focus on statutory analysis, legislative history, and the securities industry’s self-regulatory organization (SRO) model on which the PCAOB was patterned, the brief challenges the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the PCAOB is merely 'a heavily controlled component' of the SEC. The brief argues instead that the PCAOB is an independent regulatory entity subject to oversight and enforcement by the SEC, another independent regulatory entity, and that this double-decker independence stretches the Constitution’s text and precedents too far. Amici curiae: Stephen Bainbridge, Robert Bartlett, William Birdthistle, Timothy Canova, Lawrence Cunningham, James Fanto, Theresa Gabaldon, Lyman Johnson, Roberta Karmel, Donna Nagy, Lydie Pierre-Louis, Adam Pritchard, Margaret Sachs, Gordon Smith, Kellye Testy","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Supreme Court Amici Brief of Law Professors in Support of Petitioners in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, No. 08-861\",\"authors\":\"Donna M. Nagy\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.1443971\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A group of corporate and securities law professors submitted this brief as amici curiae to the United States Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Amici support Congress’s decision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to establish a new regulator to oversee the auditors of public companies. But amici express concern that the particular design chosen by Congress accords the PCAOB substantial discretion and autonomy without imposing constitutionally sufficient accountability. Specifically, the brief argues that the PCAOB's structure is unconstitutional because it violates the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. With a focus on statutory analysis, legislative history, and the securities industry’s self-regulatory organization (SRO) model on which the PCAOB was patterned, the brief challenges the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the PCAOB is merely 'a heavily controlled component' of the SEC. The brief argues instead that the PCAOB is an independent regulatory entity subject to oversight and enforcement by the SEC, another independent regulatory entity, and that this double-decker independence stretches the Constitution’s text and precedents too far. Amici curiae: Stephen Bainbridge, Robert Bartlett, William Birdthistle, Timothy Canova, Lawrence Cunningham, James Fanto, Theresa Gabaldon, Lyman Johnson, Roberta Karmel, Donna Nagy, Lydie Pierre-Louis, Adam Pritchard, Margaret Sachs, Gordon Smith, Kellye Testy\",\"PeriodicalId\":233762,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-08-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1443971\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1443971","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
一群公司法和证券法教授以法庭之友的身份向美国最高法院提交了“自由企业基金诉上市公司会计监督委员会”一案。Amici支持国会在萨班斯-奥克斯利法案中决定建立一个新的监管机构来监督上市公司的审计师。但朋友们表示担心,国会选择的特殊设计赋予PCAOB很大的自由裁量权和自主权,而没有施加宪法规定的充分责任。具体来说,该摘要认为PCAOB的结构违反宪法,因为它违反了任命条款和三权分立原则。摘要着重于法定分析、立法历史以及PCAOB所依据的证券业自律组织(SRO)模式,对华盛顿特区巡回法院关于PCAOB仅仅是SEC“一个受到严格控制的组成部分”的结论提出了质疑。摘要辩称,PCAOB是一个独立的监管实体,受SEC(另一个独立监管实体)的监督和执行。这种双层独立过度延伸了宪法文本和先例。库里之友:Stephen Bainbridge, Robert Bartlett, William Birdthistle, Timothy Canova, Lawrence Cunningham, James Fanto, Theresa Gabaldon, Lyman Johnson, Roberta Karmel, Donna Nagy, Lydie Pierre-Louis, Adam Pritchard, Margaret Sachs, Gordon Smith, kelye Testy
Supreme Court Amici Brief of Law Professors in Support of Petitioners in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, No. 08-861
A group of corporate and securities law professors submitted this brief as amici curiae to the United States Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Amici support Congress’s decision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to establish a new regulator to oversee the auditors of public companies. But amici express concern that the particular design chosen by Congress accords the PCAOB substantial discretion and autonomy without imposing constitutionally sufficient accountability. Specifically, the brief argues that the PCAOB's structure is unconstitutional because it violates the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. With a focus on statutory analysis, legislative history, and the securities industry’s self-regulatory organization (SRO) model on which the PCAOB was patterned, the brief challenges the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the PCAOB is merely 'a heavily controlled component' of the SEC. The brief argues instead that the PCAOB is an independent regulatory entity subject to oversight and enforcement by the SEC, another independent regulatory entity, and that this double-decker independence stretches the Constitution’s text and precedents too far. Amici curiae: Stephen Bainbridge, Robert Bartlett, William Birdthistle, Timothy Canova, Lawrence Cunningham, James Fanto, Theresa Gabaldon, Lyman Johnson, Roberta Karmel, Donna Nagy, Lydie Pierre-Louis, Adam Pritchard, Margaret Sachs, Gordon Smith, Kellye Testy