元数据、越狱和iOS的控制论治理:或者,区分数字隐私和数字隐私的需要

Thomas N. Cooke
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引用次数: 5

摘要

数字隐私往往被理解为代表企业和政府机构对个人信息的“自上而下”的监管和控制,通过各种政策和实践来实现。虽然智能手机制造商不断创新和改变他们的政策和做法,以反映新的和持续的网络挑战,但他们往往强调以内容数据的形式保护个人信息。另一方面,还有元数据:内容数据的度量和数学。它们在离散的运动中丰富而无处不在,是大数据移动分析领域最宝贵的商品。智能手机元数据也是最紧迫的隐私问题之一,因为它非常难以查看、研究和分析。然而,数字隐私存在另一个领域:在这个领域中,无法查看和研究元数据是不可接受的。这个完全不同的领域是由越狱者组成的——一个由黑客主义程序员组成的网络,他们将基于软件的“微调”注入苹果移动设备,以向用户显示元数据并允许用户控制它们。通过这样做,越狱者允许用户与元数据建立以前未实现的关系,从而从根本上区分“自上而下”的数字隐私和“自下而上”的数字隐私。尽管苹果经常以担心设备不稳定、用户安全漏洞和违反使用条款为由抵制越狱,但本文揭示了许多关键的隐私优先的越狱调整削弱了苹果垄断元数据流的能力。通过一种控制论治理理论,这种干预表明,苹果在多大程度上实现了其利润优先的信息保护愿景,这种愿景将许多元数据流与用户隔离开来。通过这种理论方法,我们作为分析人员可以批判性地收集元数据的(in)可见性和(il)易读性的政治意识,以及它们在数字、移动数据保护的话语中所扮演的角色。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Metadata, Jailbreaking, and the Cybernetic Governmentality of iOS: Or, the Need to Distinguish Digital Privacy from digital privacy
Digital privacy tends to be understood as the “top-down” regulation and control of personal information on the behalf of corporate and governmental institutions, realized through various policies and practices. While smartphone manufacturers increasingly innovate and alter their policies and practices to reflect new and ongoing cyber challenges, they tend to emphasize the protection of personal information in the form of content data. On the other hand, there is metadata: the measurements and math of content data. Abundant and ubiquitous in their discrete movements, they are the most precious commodity in the world of big data mobile analytics. Smartphone metadata are also one of the most pressing privacy concerns precisely because it is exceedingly difficult to see, study, and analyze. However, there is another realm through which digital privacy exists: a realm where the inability to see and study metadata is unacceptable. This entirely differently realm is comprised of jailbreakers—a network of hacktivist programmers injecting software-based “tweaks” into Apple mobile devices in ways that reveal metadata to users and allow users to control them. By doing so, jailbreakers allow users to build previously unrealized relationships with metadata and thereby radically distinguishing “top-down” Digital Privacy from “bottom-up” digital privacy. Although Apple has routinely resisted jailbreaking citing fears over device instability, user security vulnerability, and Terms of Use violations, this article reveals that many key privacy-first jailbreaking tweaks undermine Apple’s ability to monopolize metadata flows. Theorised through a cybernetic governmentality, this intervention demonstrates the extents to which Apple goes to reify its profit-first vision of information protection, one which insulates many metadata flows from its users. Through this theoretical approach, we as analysts can critically glean awareness of the politics of the (in)visibility and (il)legibility of metadata and the role they play in the discourse on digital, mobile data protection.
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