定向搜索中的信息广告

MKTG: Advertising (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-04-11 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2040983

P. GOMIS‐PORQUERAS, B. Julien, Chengsi Wang

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们考虑一个定向搜索环境，在这个环境中，能力受限的卖家通过昂贵的广告找到不协调的买家，而买家则以概率的方式观察所有的价格。我们发现:(1)均衡广告强度在市场紧度下呈倒u形，(2)拍卖机制下的均衡广告强度高于公布定价机制下的均衡广告强度，(3)即使在大型市场中，均衡价格与知情买家的度量也可能呈正相关。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Informative Advertising in Directed Search

We consider a directed search environment where capacity constrained sellers reach uncoordinated buyers through costly advertising while buyers observed all prices probabilistically. We show that: (i) the equilibrium advertising intensity has an inverted U-shape in market tightness, (ii) the equilibrium advertising intensity is higher under an auction mechanism than under posted pricing, and (iii) the equilibrium price and measure of informed buyers may be positively correlated even in large markets.

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MKTG: Advertising (Topic)

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