Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Julie Chytilová, G. Roland, Tomáš Želinský
{"title":"对少数群体的转移惩罚:替罪羊的实验证据","authors":"Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Julie Chytilová, G. Roland, Tomáš Želinský","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3891611","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment ‘passed’ on innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating\",\"authors\":\"Michal Bauer, Jana Cahlíková, Julie Chytilová, G. Roland, Tomáš Želinský\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3891611\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment ‘passed’ on innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.\",\"PeriodicalId\":300059,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891611\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891611","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating
Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment ‘passed’ on innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.