{"title":"GSIB地位与企业贷款:国际分析","authors":"H. Degryse, M. Mariathasan, T. Tang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3642702","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) benefit from implicit government guarantees but face additional capital requirements and oversight. This paper examines the effectiveness of the Financial Stability Board's recently introduced GSIB-framework and its short-run implications for the real economy, by exploiting the leak of a partially accurate GSIB list by the Financial Times. We find that GSIB-designation reduces the supply of syndicated loans to risky corporate borrowers by 8%, and that these borrowers experience lower asset-, investment- and sales growth than similar firms borrowing from non-GSIB banks. The results appear to be driven by stricter supervision, not by higher capital surcharges.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"GSIB Status and Corporate Lending: An International Analysis\",\"authors\":\"H. Degryse, M. Mariathasan, T. Tang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3642702\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) benefit from implicit government guarantees but face additional capital requirements and oversight. This paper examines the effectiveness of the Financial Stability Board's recently introduced GSIB-framework and its short-run implications for the real economy, by exploiting the leak of a partially accurate GSIB list by the Financial Times. We find that GSIB-designation reduces the supply of syndicated loans to risky corporate borrowers by 8%, and that these borrowers experience lower asset-, investment- and sales growth than similar firms borrowing from non-GSIB banks. The results appear to be driven by stricter supervision, not by higher capital surcharges.\",\"PeriodicalId\":299344,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-06-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3642702\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3642702","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
GSIB Status and Corporate Lending: An International Analysis
Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) benefit from implicit government guarantees but face additional capital requirements and oversight. This paper examines the effectiveness of the Financial Stability Board's recently introduced GSIB-framework and its short-run implications for the real economy, by exploiting the leak of a partially accurate GSIB list by the Financial Times. We find that GSIB-designation reduces the supply of syndicated loans to risky corporate borrowers by 8%, and that these borrowers experience lower asset-, investment- and sales growth than similar firms borrowing from non-GSIB banks. The results appear to be driven by stricter supervision, not by higher capital surcharges.