GSIB地位与企业贷款:国际分析

H. Degryse, M. Mariathasan, T. Tang
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引用次数: 5

摘要

全球系统重要性银行(gsib)受益于政府的隐性担保,但面临额外的资本要求和监管。本文利用英国《金融时报》泄露的一份部分准确的GSIB名单,考察了金融稳定委员会(Financial Stability Board)最近推出的GSIB框架的有效性及其对实体经济的短期影响。我们发现,被指定为gsib会使高风险企业借款人的银团贷款供应减少8%,并且这些借款人的资产、投资和销售增长低于从非gsib银行借款的类似企业。这一结果似乎是由更严格的监管推动的,而不是由更高的资本附加费推动的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
GSIB Status and Corporate Lending: An International Analysis
Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) benefit from implicit government guarantees but face additional capital requirements and oversight. This paper examines the effectiveness of the Financial Stability Board's recently introduced GSIB-framework and its short-run implications for the real economy, by exploiting the leak of a partially accurate GSIB list by the Financial Times. We find that GSIB-designation reduces the supply of syndicated loans to risky corporate borrowers by 8%, and that these borrowers experience lower asset-, investment- and sales growth than similar firms borrowing from non-GSIB banks. The results appear to be driven by stricter supervision, not by higher capital surcharges.
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