CEO薪酬中的相对绩效评估:来自2006年披露规则的证据

Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-12-07 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1710386

David De Angelis, Yaniv Grinstein

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引用次数: 31

摘要

2006年12月，美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)发布了新规定，要求披露在CEO薪酬合同中使用相对绩效评估(RPE)的情况。我们发现，大约三分之一的样本公司在CEO薪酬合同中使用了RPE。平均而言，RPE用户将奖项估计价值的一半与RPE挂钩。当公司在正确的业绩基准方面面临较少的不确定性时，它们将更大比例的奖励与RPE挂钩。我们发现几乎没有证据支持基于产品市场竞争、CEO对冲约束或管理层权力的假设。

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Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: Evidence from the 2006 Disclosure Rules

In December 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued new rules that require the disclosure of the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO compensation contracts. We find that about a third of the sample firms use RPE in the CEO compensation contract. On average, RPE users tie about half of the estimated value of the awards to RPE. Firms tie a larger fraction of their awards to RPE when they face less uncertainty regarding the right performance benchmark. We find little evidence to support hypotheses based on product market competition, CEO hedging constraints, or managerial power.

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Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series

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