双边匹配市场中的周期冲突与单核心

ERN: Market Structure (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3344803

Bora Evci

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文通过一种动态机制，提出了一个新的周期准则——周期冲突准则。我们首先表明，CCs提供了双边匹配市场中单核的完整表征。其次，我们证明了CCs结构与稳定匹配的晶格结构之间存在双射。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Cyclical Conflicts and Singleton Cores in Two-Sided Matching Markets

In this paper, we propose a new cycle criterion, Cyclical Conflicts (CCs), for preference profiles in two-sided matching markets through a dynamic mechanism. We first show that CCs provide a complete characterization of singleton cores in two-sided matching markets. Secondly, we prove the existence of a bijection between the CCs structures and the lattice structures of stable matchings.

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ERN: Market Structure (Topic)

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