基于Stackelberg和Nash议价博弈模型的供应链公平动态演化

Yanhong Qin, H. Le
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引用次数: 0

摘要

根据零售商公平性关注的合理性程度和信息完备性,将零售商公平性关注的信息结构划分为四个阶段。然后,我们建立Stackelberg和Nash议价博弈模型,运用逆向归纳法计算供应链各阶段的主客观效率,并引入“公平熵”计算供应链的主客观公平度,从主客观两个维度分析公平信息不对称如何影响供应链效率和公平度的动态变化。通过比较分析,我们证明了在Stackelberg博弈模型下,供应链不能实现协调和最大公平度,而在Nash议价博弈模型下,供应链在效用上可以实现协调和最大公平度。此外,纳什议价博弈模型比Stackelberg博弈模型更有利于提高供应链效率和供应链渠道的和谐发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Dynamic evolution of supply chain fairness based on Stackelberg and Nash bargaining game model
According to the rationality degree of retailer and information completeness of fairness concern, the information structure of retailer's fairness concern can be divided into four stages. Then, we set Stackelberg and Nash bargaining game model and use the reverse induction method to compute the subjective and objective efficiency of supply chain in each stage, and the “fair entropy” is introduced to calculate the subjective and objective fairness degree of supply chain so as to analyze how the asymmetric fairness information affect the dynamic change of supply chain efficiency and fairness degree in terms of subjective and objective dimensions. By comparative analysis, we prove that the supply chain can't achieve coordination and maximum fairness degree under Stackelberg game model, while the supply chain can achieve coordination and maximize fairness degree in term of utility under Nash bargaining game model. Besides, Nash bargaining game model is more conducive to improve supply chain efficiency and harmonious development of supply chain channel than Stackelberg game model.
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