物理不可克隆函数的统计测试侧通道阻力评估方法

Y. Nozaki, M. Yoshikawa
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了获得物联网(IoT)的安全性,物理不可克隆功能(puf)引起了人们的关注。在硬件安全方面,近年来人们指出了PUF存在侧信道攻击的风险。因此,已经提出了针对sca的对策,并报道了现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)的实施评估。另一方面,对具有对抗措施的puf进行评估需要利用多侧信道信息进行实际建模攻击;因此,成本增加。本研究提出了一种新的不需要实际建模攻击的PUF安全评估方法。该方法通过对PUF运行过程中实测的功耗波形进行统计检验,验证了侧信道泄漏的存在性。在FPGA上进行的实验中,利用该方法验证了在无对抗的情况下PUF有显著差异。实验还表明,采用对策后的PUF不会出现显著差异,该方法可以方便地评估PUF的安全性,无需实际的建模攻击。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Side-Channel Resistance Evaluation Method using Statistical Tests for Physical Unclonable Function
To obtain the internet of things (IoT) security, physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have attracted attention. Regarding hardware security, in recent years, the risk of side-channel attacks (SCAs) for PUF is pointed out. Therefore, countermeasures against SCAs have been proposed, and field programmable gate array (FPGA) implementation evaluations have also been reported. On the other hand, the evaluation of PUFs with countermeasures needs actual modeling attacks using many side-channel information; therefore, costs increase. This study proposes a new PUF security evaluation method, which does not need actual modeling attacks. The proposed method verifies the existence of side-channel leakages by applying statistical tests to measured power consumption waveforms during PUF operations. In experiments using an FPGA, by using the proposed method, it was confirmed that there were significant differences in the PUF without countermeasure. Experiments also showed that significant differences did not appear in the PUF with countermeasure and the proposed method could evaluate the PUF security easily without actual modeling attacks.
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