水的全部拍卖

D. Zetland
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了一种重新分配临时水流或永久水权的新机制。在不损害水权持有者的情况下,通过重新分配水资源,提高了效率和社会福利。aia可用于在传统用途或新用途之间分配可变或减少的流量。aia适用于在成员之间分配水的大型组织,例如灌溉区或水批发机构。成员将决定何时以及如何使用亚投行,即当交易成本高、环境约束具有约束力或需要向外部分配时。实验表明,友邦保险重新分配更多的单位,效率并不低于传统的双边拍卖。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
All-in-Auctions for Water
This paper proposes a novel mechanism for reallocating temporary water flows or permanent water rights. The All-in-Auction (AiA) increases efficiency and social welfare by reallocating water without harming water rights holders. AiAs can be used to allocate variable or diminished flows among traditional or new uses. AiAs are appropriate for use within larger organizations that distribute water among members, e.g., irrigation districts or wholesale water agencies. Members would decide when and how to use AiAs, i.e., when transaction costs are high, environmental constraints are binding, or allocation to outsiders is desired. Experimental sessions show that an AiA reallocates more units with no less efficiency that traditional two-sided auctions.
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