利用5G定位能力进行GPS欺骗检测

A. Famili, M. Foruhandeh, Tolga O. Atalay, A. Stavrou, Haining Wang
{"title":"利用5G定位能力进行GPS欺骗检测","authors":"A. Famili, M. Foruhandeh, Tolga O. Atalay, A. Stavrou, Haining Wang","doi":"10.1109/LATINCOM56090.2022.10000569","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Global Positioning System (GPS) is the most predominant non-authenticated navigation system used in transportation networks for geolocation and timing. The security of GPS is not addressed at the design level, and its implementation is public knowledge, making all GPS-equipped devices susceptible to GPS spoofing attacks. Existing solutions such as cryptography are either not backward compatible or too expensive to implement. Here, we propose an approach without such drawbacks. We present a novel technique to detect GPS spoofing attacks by comparing the final estimated location based on the GPS measurements with that derived by 5G New Radio positioning signals. In case of discrepancy, we detect the GPS spoofing attack and bypass the attacker by replacing the GPS-based localization with 5G-based localization. Our experiments show a detection rate above 98%.","PeriodicalId":221354,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"GPS Spoofing Detection by Leveraging 5G Positioning Capabilities\",\"authors\":\"A. Famili, M. Foruhandeh, Tolga O. Atalay, A. Stavrou, Haining Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/LATINCOM56090.2022.10000569\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Global Positioning System (GPS) is the most predominant non-authenticated navigation system used in transportation networks for geolocation and timing. The security of GPS is not addressed at the design level, and its implementation is public knowledge, making all GPS-equipped devices susceptible to GPS spoofing attacks. Existing solutions such as cryptography are either not backward compatible or too expensive to implement. Here, we propose an approach without such drawbacks. We present a novel technique to detect GPS spoofing attacks by comparing the final estimated location based on the GPS measurements with that derived by 5G New Radio positioning signals. In case of discrepancy, we detect the GPS spoofing attack and bypass the attacker by replacing the GPS-based localization with 5G-based localization. Our experiments show a detection rate above 98%.\",\"PeriodicalId\":221354,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2022 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2022 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/LATINCOM56090.2022.10000569\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2022 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/LATINCOM56090.2022.10000569","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

摘要

全球定位系统(GPS)是交通网络中用于地理定位和授时的最主要的非认证导航系统。GPS的安全性并没有在设计层面得到解决,其实现是众所周知的,这使得所有配备GPS的设备都容易受到GPS欺骗攻击。现有的解决方案(如加密)要么不向后兼容,要么实现起来太昂贵。在这里,我们提出了一种没有这些缺点的方法。我们提出了一种检测GPS欺骗攻击的新技术,通过比较基于GPS测量的最终估计位置与5G新无线电定位信号得出的最终估计位置。在不一致的情况下,我们检测GPS欺骗攻击,用5g定位取代GPS定位,绕过攻击者。我们的实验表明,检测率在98%以上。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
GPS Spoofing Detection by Leveraging 5G Positioning Capabilities
Global Positioning System (GPS) is the most predominant non-authenticated navigation system used in transportation networks for geolocation and timing. The security of GPS is not addressed at the design level, and its implementation is public knowledge, making all GPS-equipped devices susceptible to GPS spoofing attacks. Existing solutions such as cryptography are either not backward compatible or too expensive to implement. Here, we propose an approach without such drawbacks. We present a novel technique to detect GPS spoofing attacks by comparing the final estimated location based on the GPS measurements with that derived by 5G New Radio positioning signals. In case of discrepancy, we detect the GPS spoofing attack and bypass the attacker by replacing the GPS-based localization with 5G-based localization. Our experiments show a detection rate above 98%.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信