公私伙伴关系与经济效率:韩国城市轨道交通系统的案例研究

Sounman Hong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了公私合作(PPP)安排是否提高了韩国城市轨道交通系统的运营成本效率。总的来说,有证据表明,私人参与并没有有助于降低服务运营的成本。该研究还解释了私营伙伴关系中成本优势的缺失可能与典型PPP的两个决定性特征有关:将不同的活动捆绑到一个单一的合同中,以及公私双方分担风险。我认为,如果在捆绑活动中存在负外部性,公共和私人各方之间的风险分担可能会大大削弱特许经营者进行成本管理的动机。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Public-Private Partnership and Economic Efficiency: A Case Study of the Korean Urban Rail Transit System
This study examines whether a public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement improved operational cost efficiency in Korea’s urban rail transit system. Overall, evidence suggests that private participation has not contributed to cost reduction in service operation. The study also explains how the absence of cost advantage in the private partnership may be associated with the two defining characteristics of a typical PPP: the bundling of different activities into a single contract and risk sharing between the public and private parties. I argue that, if negative externalities exist across the bundled activities, the risk sharing between the public and private parties may greatly weaken the concessionaire’s incentive for cost management.
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