延迟产品发布:失去销售的战略利益

Mushegh Harutyunyan, C. Narasimhan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

当一个公司的竞争对手比它早发布产品时,许多消费者可能会决定购买竞争对手的产品,而不是等待该公司的产品发布。因此,在没有产品改进效果或任何其他后发优势的情况下,公司应该通过加速产品发布来避免失去太多的销售。本文分析了企业产品发布时间与定价决策之间的战略关系,发现即使在没有产品改进利益和后发优势的情况下,企业也可能通过比竞争对手晚发布产品而获得更好的收益。此外,在一定条件下,如果竞争对手在早期市场占据了很大份额,而不是很小的份额,公司就会受益。换句话说,竞争对手市场渗透水平的提高可以使公司受益。直观地说,通过延迟发布产品,公司诱使不太忠诚的客户购买竞争对手的产品,而公司更忠诚的客户选择等待公司的产品发布。当公司最终发布其产品时,它有动机收取更高的价格,以从推迟购买的消费者那里获得更多的剩余。企业提价后,其竞争对手也会随之提价,从而缓解价格竞争,使所有企业受益。此外,我们的研究结果表明,首先发布产品的公司可能会更好地采用渗透定价策略,而不是撇价策略,因为渗透定价有助于缓解未来的价格竞争,而撇价策略会使价格竞争更加激烈。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Late Product Release: The Strategic Benefit of Lost Sales
When a firm’s competitor releases its product earlier than the firm, many consumers may decide to buy the competitor’s product, rather than wait for the firm’s product release. Hence, in the absence of product improvement effects or any other late-mover advantages, the firm should benefit by hastening its product release to avoid losing too many sales. In this paper, we analyze the strategic relationship between the firms’ product release timing and pricing decisions, and we find that even when there are no product improvement benefits and late-mover advantages, the firm may be better off by releasing its product later than the competitor. Furthermore, under certain conditions, the firm can benefit if its competitor captures a large share of the early market, rather than a small share. In other words, an increase in the competitor’s market penetration level can benefit the firm. Intuitively, by releasing its product later, the firm induces its less committed customers to buy the competitor’s product, while the firm’s more committed customers choose to wait for the firm’s product release. When the firm finally releases its product, it has an incentive to charge a higher price to extract more surplus from the segment of consumers who postponed their purchases. The firm’s increased price induces the firm’s competitor to also increase its price, alleviating price competition and benefiting all firms. Further, our results suggest that the firm that is the first to release its product may be better off by using penetration pricing strategy rather than price skimming, because penetration pricing will help mitigate future price competition, while price skimming will make it more intense.
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