高管薪酬与合法投资者保护:来自中国上市公司的证据

ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Macroeconomics (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-01 DOI:10.1111/rode.12209

Zhigang Zheng, Li-an Zhou, Yanmei Sun, Chao Chen

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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文试图将中国高管薪酬的增长与法律环境的改善联系起来。我们建立了一个简单的模型，证明了法律投资者保护的改善降低了管理者的私人控制权利益;为了使管理激励相容，必须以增加行政人员薪酬的形式补偿一些被放弃的私人利益。利用中国上市公司的大型数据集，我们发现强有力的证据表明，法律环境的改善与高管薪酬的上升和代理成本的降低显著相关，这与我们的模型预测一致。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Executive Compensation and Legal Investor Protection: Evidence from China's Listed Firms

This paper seeks to relate the increases in executive compensation observed in China to improvement of the legal environment. We build a simple model and demonstrate that improvement in legal investor protection reduces the manager's private benefits of control; in order to make the managerial incentives compatible, some of the forgone private benefits have to be compensated in the form of increased executive pay. Using a large dataset on Chinese listed corporations, we find strong evidence that improvement of the legal environment is significantly associated with both the rise in executive compensation and the reduction in agency costs, which is consistent with our model predictions.

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ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Macroeconomics (Topic)

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