债务合同下的过度投资和过度借贷

M. Sakuragawa
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在借贷双方存在信息不对称的情况下,我们研究了一种契约形式,并研究了最优贷款规模。最优契约具有标准债务契约的特征。然而,最优贷款规模并不总是采取最大股权参与的形式。如果单位贷款收益是贷款规模的递减函数,则合同采用最大股权参与的形式。相反,如果贷款的单位回报是贷款规模的递增函数,则可能出现过度投资或过度借贷。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
OVERINVESTMENT AND OVERBORROWING UNDER THE DEBT CONTRACTS
In the presence of asymmetric information between a lender and a borrower with costly monitoring, we investigate a contract form and an optimal loan size are investigated. The optimal contract has the features of a standard debt contract. However, the optimal loan size does not always take the form of maximum equity participation. If per unit of return from lending is a decreasing function of the loan size, the contract takes the form of maxi mumequity participation. Conversely, if per unit of return from lending is an increasing function of the loan size, overinvestment or overborrowing may arise.
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