监管改革:评估政府数据

R. Hahn
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引用次数: 10

摘要

本文对联邦监管活动的成本和收益提供了迄今为止最全面的评估。根据政府自己的数字作出的评估显示,1981年至1996年中期颁布的最终条例的净收益接近净现值1.6万亿美元。分析还表明,政府可以显著提高监管的净收益。只有不到一半的最终法规通过了中立经济学家的收益成本测试。如果各机构拒绝这些规定,净收益可能增加约2800亿美元。如果机构用更有效的替代方案取代现有法规,或者机构大幅改善监管计划,净收益也会增加。官方监管的效率因机构和监管旨在降低的风险类型而异。交通部的法规占最终法规总净收益的一半以上,尽管它们在所有法规中所占的比例不到10%。环境保护局法规的净收益仅占总净收益的三分之一,主要是因为19项清洁空气法案法规具有高净收益,尽管所有法规的三分之二是EPA法规。平均而言,降低癌症风险的法规比其他社会法规效率更低,而EPA的癌症法规似乎比其他癌症法规效率更低。减少车祸、火灾或工作相关事故风险的法规通常比减少癌症和心脏病风险的法规更有效。该研究还表明,监管的效率并没有像一些学者所说的那样随着时间的推移而下降。此外,管理和预算局引入正式的监管监督似乎并不影响监管的成本效益。本文表明,机构对里根第12291号行政命令和克林顿第12866号行政命令中监管影响分析要求的遵守情况,是机构评估监管成本和收益的基础,通常是肤浅的。因此,这种分析的质量通常很差。部分由于分析的质量较差,机构似乎并不经常使用分析来改善监管结果。如果国会和白宫认真对待监管改革,它们就必须合作,强制执行监管影响分析要求。成功的执法需要高层的政治支持,法定语言要求所有机构遵守既定的经济分析原则,并由独立实体对机构分析进行严格审查。目前,尚不清楚立法者是否愿意动用必要的政治力量来实现真正的改革。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government's Numbers
This paper provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the costs and benefits of federal regulatory activities. The assessment, based on the government's own numbers, shows that the net benefits for final regulations promulgated from 1981 to mid-1996 approach a net present value of $1.6 trillion. The analysis also shows that the government can significantly increase the net benefits of regulation. Less than half of final regulations pass a neutral economist's benefit-cost test. Net benefits could increase by approximately $280 billion if agencies rejected such regulations. Net benefits could also increase if agencies replace existing regulations with more efficient alternatives, or if agencies substantially improve regulatory programs. The efficiency of official regulations varies by agency and by the type of risk the regulation is designed to reduce. Regulations from the Department of Transportation comprise over half of the total net benefits of final regulations, although they account for less than 10% of all regulations. The net benefits of regulations from the Environmental Protection Agency account for only a third of total net benefits, primarily because of 19 Clean Air Act regulations with high net benefits, although two-thirds of all regulations are EPA regulations. On average, regulations that reduce cancer risk are less efficient than other social regulations, and EPA cancer regulations appear less efficient than other cancer regulations. Regulations that reduce the risk of car, fire, or work-related accidents are generally more efficient than regulations that reduce the risk of cancer and heart disease. The study also shows that the efficiency of regulations ha not declined over time, as some scholars suggest. Furthermore, the introduction of formal regulatory oversight by the OMB does not appear to influence the cost-effectiveness of regulations. The paper shows that agency compliance with regulatory impact analysis requirements in Reagan's Executive Order 12291 and Clinton's Executive Order 12866, the basis for agency estimates of the costs and benefits or regulation, is usually superficial. As a result, the quality of such analyses is generally poor. Partly because of the poor quality of analyses, it appears that agencies do not often use the analyses to improve regulatory outcomes. If Congress and the White House are serious about regulatory reform, they must cooperate to enforce the regulatory impact analyses requirement. Successful enforcement requires high-level political support, statutory language requiring all agencies to adhere to established principles of economic analysis, and rigorous review of agency analyses by an independent entity. At this time, it is unclear whether law makes are willing to exert the political muscle necessary to achieve real reform.
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