董事会做什么?来自董事会委员会和董事薪酬数据的证据

Renée B. Adams
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引用次数: 143

摘要

本文利用1998年352家财富500强企业1542个董事会委员会和董事薪酬的数据,分析了董事会行为的差异。我用这些数据来量化董事会在三个不同职能上投入的努力:监督、处理战略问题和考虑利益相关者的利益。我指出,董事会似乎认真对待其传统的监督角色,因为一般而言,董事会主要致力于监督。然而,在不同的公司中,董事会对不同职能的投入程度存在相当大的差异。特别是大公司和面临更多不确定性的公司的董事会对监督的投入相对较少,而多元化公司的董事会对监督的投入相对较多。规模更大、成长更久的老公司的董事会在绝对和相对基础上都更努力地维护利益相关者的利益。最后,成长型公司的董事会在战略问题上投入的精力相对更多。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What Do Boards Do? Evidence from Board Committee and Director Compensation Data
This paper uses data on 1542 board committees and director compensation in a sample of 352 Fortune 500 companies in 1998 to analyze variation in board behavior. I use this data to quantify the amount of effort boards devote to their three different functions: monitoring, dealing with strategic issues and considering the interests of stakeholders. I show that boards appear to take their traditional oversight role seriously, since on average boards devote effort primarily to monitoring. However, there is a fair amount of variation across firms in the amount of effort boards devote to their different functions. In particular boards of larger firms and firms that face more uncertainty devote relatively less effort to monitoring, while boards of diversified firms devote relatively more effort to monitoring. Boards of larger, growing and older firms devote more effort to stakeholder interests on both an absolute and a relative basis. Finally, boards of growing firms devote relatively more effort to strategic issues.
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