{"title":"创始人担任董事时的公司治理","authors":"Feng Li, Suraj Srinivasan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1663905","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.","PeriodicalId":377605,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"156","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Corporate Governance When Founders are Directors\",\"authors\":\"Feng Li, Suraj Srinivasan\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1663905\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.\",\"PeriodicalId\":377605,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-12-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"156\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1663905\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERPN: Governance (Management) (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1663905","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.
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