微电网的网络物理安全

Prashanth Palaniswamy, B. McMillin
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引用次数: 3

摘要

信息物理系统(CPS)是由基于计算机的系统控制或监视的物理系统。CPS是计算、网络和物理过程的组合。由于CPS是各种不同组件的组合,因此容易受到多种安全威胁。此外,存在许多不同的安全域(不仅仅是高/低,也不一定是分层的)。本文利用先前开发的多安全域不可演绎性来发现微电网中潜在的完整性漏洞。然后,通过在系统操作上添加可执行不变量,尽可能地减轻这些问题。本文报道了新加坡科技设计大学电力与智能控制(EPIC)试验台的实现情况。报告了攻击缓解的设计局限性和成功/缺点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cyber-Physical Security of an Electric Microgrid
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are physical systems that are controlled or monitored by computer-based systems. CPS are a combination of computation, networking, and physical processes. As CPS are a combination of various diverse components, they are vulnerable to several security threats. Moreover, there are many different security domains (not just high/low, nor are they necessarily hierarchical). This paper utilizes previouslydeveloped Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility to uncover potential integrity vulnerabilities in an electric microgrid. These are then mitigated, to the extent possible, by adding executable invariants on system operation. Implementation on the Electric Power and Intelligent Control (EPIC) testbed at the Singapore University of Technology and Design are reported. Limitations of the design and successes/shortcomings of attack mitigation are reported.
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