THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REALIZING THE STATE POLICY IN THE FIELD OF THE CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN UKRAINE

INTRODUCTION In 2015-2016, several specialized anti-corruption agencies were created – the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NACB) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SACPO) – as an independent structural unit in the structure of the General Prosecutor’s Office, as well as the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC), and others. The creation, staff assistance and the first steps to new institutions took place in a harsh political struggle and active opposition from the representatives of the political elite, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary corpus, interested in maintaining the status quo. As practice shows, the activity of newly-formed agencies does not comply with the public request. This is due to functional weaknesses of the specialized anti-corruption institutions and the failure to reform the judiciary system, and, as a result, in a number of cases the direct opposition of the judges 1 . What separates corruption crimes from others is their high latency, which complicates the provision of their criminological characteristics. According to scientific research only 1-5% of corruption crimes get to be investigated by the law enforcement agencies. The rest remains latent, and the perpetrators remain unpunished, as they are not being prosecuted and can freely continue their criminal activity 2 . Thus, official data on the state of corruption does not reflect its actual state; it only shows us the activity of law enforcement agencies against such crimes. In addition, it is usually small officials that are brought to the liability. Meanwhile, transnational criminal groups take part in the bribery of politicians who can influence economic processes in the state in the direction that their customers want.