基于市场的分布式调度的一些经济学

Proceedings. 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (Cat. No.98CB36183) Pub Date : 1998-05-26 DOI:10.1109/ICDCS.1998.679848

W. E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wurman, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason

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引用次数: 158

摘要

市场机制通过根据市场价格分配计划资源来解决分布式调度问题。我们将分布式调度建模为一个离散的资源分配问题，并证明了经济分析在该框架中的适用性。利用文献的结果，我们讨论了一类一般调度问题的均衡价格的存在性，以及均衡解的质量。然后，我们提出了两种用于实现解决方案的拍卖协议，并分析了它们的计算和经济特性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling

Market mechanisms solve distributed scheduling problems by allocating the scheduled resources according to market prices. We model distributed scheduling as a discrete resource allocation problem, and demonstrate the applicability of economic analysis to this framework. Drawing on results from the literature, we discuss the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, and the quality of equilibrium solutions. We then present two auction protocols for implementing solutions, and analyze their computational and economic properties.

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来源期刊

Proceedings. 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (Cat. No.98CB36183)

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