碳排放配额回购策略下的资本约束供应链碳排放配额方法

Yuyan Wang, Fei Lin, T. Cheng, Fu Jia, Yulin Sun
{"title":"碳排放配额回购策略下的资本约束供应链碳排放配额方法","authors":"Yuyan Wang, Fei Lin, T. Cheng, Fu Jia, Yulin Sun","doi":"10.1108/imds-12-2022-0749","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate which of the two carbon allowance allocation methods (CAAMs), i.e. grandfathered system carbon allowance allocation (GCAA) and baseline system carbon allowance allocation (BCAA), is more beneficial to capital-constrained supply chains under the carbon emission allowance repurchase strategy (CEARS).Design/methodology/approachAdopting CEARS to ease the capital-constrained supply chains, this study develops two-period game models with manufacturers as leaders and retailers as followers from the perspective of profit and social welfare maximization under two CAAMs (GCAA and BCAA), where the first period produces normal products, and the second period produces low-carbon products.FindingsFirst, higher carbon-saving can better use CEARS and achieve a higher supply chain profit under the two CAAMs. However, the higher the end-of-period carbon price is, the lower the social welfare is. Second, when carbon-saving is small, GCAA achieves both economic and environmental benefits; BCAA reduces carbon emissions at the expense of economic benefit. Third, the supply chain members gain higher profits and social welfare under GCAA, so the government and supply chain members are more inclined to choose GCAA.Originality/valueBy analyzing the profits and total carbon emissions of capital-constrained supply chains under GCAA and BCAA, this study provides theoretical references for retailers and capital-constrained manufacturers. In addition, by comparing the difference in social welfare under GCAA and BCAA, it provides a basis for the government to choose a reasonable CAAM.","PeriodicalId":270213,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Management & Data Systems","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Carbon allowance approach for capital-constrained supply chain under carbon emission allowance repurchase strategy\",\"authors\":\"Yuyan Wang, Fei Lin, T. Cheng, Fu Jia, Yulin Sun\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/imds-12-2022-0749\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate which of the two carbon allowance allocation methods (CAAMs), i.e. grandfathered system carbon allowance allocation (GCAA) and baseline system carbon allowance allocation (BCAA), is more beneficial to capital-constrained supply chains under the carbon emission allowance repurchase strategy (CEARS).Design/methodology/approachAdopting CEARS to ease the capital-constrained supply chains, this study develops two-period game models with manufacturers as leaders and retailers as followers from the perspective of profit and social welfare maximization under two CAAMs (GCAA and BCAA), where the first period produces normal products, and the second period produces low-carbon products.FindingsFirst, higher carbon-saving can better use CEARS and achieve a higher supply chain profit under the two CAAMs. However, the higher the end-of-period carbon price is, the lower the social welfare is. Second, when carbon-saving is small, GCAA achieves both economic and environmental benefits; BCAA reduces carbon emissions at the expense of economic benefit. Third, the supply chain members gain higher profits and social welfare under GCAA, so the government and supply chain members are more inclined to choose GCAA.Originality/valueBy analyzing the profits and total carbon emissions of capital-constrained supply chains under GCAA and BCAA, this study provides theoretical references for retailers and capital-constrained manufacturers. In addition, by comparing the difference in social welfare under GCAA and BCAA, it provides a basis for the government to choose a reasonable CAAM.\",\"PeriodicalId\":270213,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Industrial Management & Data Systems\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-04-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Industrial Management & Data Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1108/imds-12-2022-0749\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Industrial Management & Data Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/imds-12-2022-0749","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究的目的是探讨在碳排放配额回购策略(CEARS)下,祖父制度碳配额分配(GCAA)和基线制度碳配额分配(BCAA)两种碳配额分配方法(CAAMs)中,哪一种更有利于资本约束的供应链。设计/方法/方法采用CEARS缓解资金紧张的供应链,从GCAA和BCAA两种caam的利润和社会福利最大化的角度,建立了制造商为领导者,零售商为追随者的两期博弈模型,其中第一期生产正常产品,第二期生产低碳产品。首先,在两种caam下,更高的碳节约可以更好地利用CEARS,实现更高的供应链利润。但期末碳价越高,社会福利越低。第二,当减碳量较小时,GCAA实现了经济效益和环境效益并重;BCAA以经济效益为代价减少碳排放。第三,供应链成员在GCAA下获得了更高的利润和社会福利,因此政府和供应链成员更倾向于选择GCAA。独创性/价值本研究通过分析GCAA和BCAA下资本约束供应链的利润和碳排放总量,为零售商和资本约束制造商提供理论参考。此外,通过比较GCAA与BCAA下的社会福利差异,为政府选择合理的CAAM提供依据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Carbon allowance approach for capital-constrained supply chain under carbon emission allowance repurchase strategy
PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate which of the two carbon allowance allocation methods (CAAMs), i.e. grandfathered system carbon allowance allocation (GCAA) and baseline system carbon allowance allocation (BCAA), is more beneficial to capital-constrained supply chains under the carbon emission allowance repurchase strategy (CEARS).Design/methodology/approachAdopting CEARS to ease the capital-constrained supply chains, this study develops two-period game models with manufacturers as leaders and retailers as followers from the perspective of profit and social welfare maximization under two CAAMs (GCAA and BCAA), where the first period produces normal products, and the second period produces low-carbon products.FindingsFirst, higher carbon-saving can better use CEARS and achieve a higher supply chain profit under the two CAAMs. However, the higher the end-of-period carbon price is, the lower the social welfare is. Second, when carbon-saving is small, GCAA achieves both economic and environmental benefits; BCAA reduces carbon emissions at the expense of economic benefit. Third, the supply chain members gain higher profits and social welfare under GCAA, so the government and supply chain members are more inclined to choose GCAA.Originality/valueBy analyzing the profits and total carbon emissions of capital-constrained supply chains under GCAA and BCAA, this study provides theoretical references for retailers and capital-constrained manufacturers. In addition, by comparing the difference in social welfare under GCAA and BCAA, it provides a basis for the government to choose a reasonable CAAM.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信