网络协议实现中的访问控制漏洞:攻击者如何利用它们以及如何应对

Daniel Ricardo dos Santos
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引用次数: 0

摘要

身份验证和访问控制机制应该验证系统用户的身份,并确保这些用户仅在其预期权限内进行操作。这些机制与审计或入侵检测一起被称为“信息和系统安全的基础”[8]。已经有大量的研究提出了用于操作技术(OT)和物联网(IoT)[7]的网络协议和设备的认证和授权机制。尽管这些设备运行着我们的关键基础设施,但它们中的大多数仍然依赖于简单的基于密码的机制来防止未经授权的操作。更令人担忧的是,即使是这些简单的机制通常也有缺陷的实现,允许恶意行为者绕过它们。在这次演讲中,我将讨论我们对物联网,OT和IT系统的网络协议实现中的漏洞的研究结果,特别关注那些源于有缺陷的身份验证和访问控制实现的漏洞。示例包括处理用户凭证时缓冲区溢出、使用弱加密、以明文形式传输凭证、硬编码凭证、通过MAC或IP欺骗绕过身份验证、客户端身份验证、身份验证中缺少关键步骤、会话过期不足以及在建立对等身份之前对消息进行解析。这些问题在不同的实现中被发现,如嵌入式TCP/IP栈[2,3]、路由套件和主要供应商[9]的OT设备工程协议。这种类型的漏洞使攻击者能够使设备脱机,操纵其操作参数,并在许多情况下执行任意代码。我还将介绍来自一组特定于OT和iot的蜜罐的统计数据,这些蜜罐涉及利用身份验证绕过、暴力强制密码和泄露凭证的攻击。这些统计数据表明,这些系统最常见的初始访问技术包括通过猜测或泄漏通用或特定于应用程序的凭据来利用远程管理协议[4]。最后,我将讨论协作威胁情报和现代网络访问控制作为预防、检测和响应此类攻击的方法的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Access Control Vulnerabilities in Network Protocol Implementations: How Attackers Exploit Them and What To Do About It
Authentication and access control mechanisms should verify the identity of users of a system and ensure that these users only act within their intended permissions. These mechanisms, alongside audit or intrusion detection, have been called the "foundation for information and system security'' [8]. There has been a large amount of research proposing authentication and authorization mechanisms for network protocols and devices used in Operational Technology (OT) and the Internet of Things (IoT) [7]. Although these devices run our critical infrastructure, most of them still rely on simple password-based mechanisms to prevent unauthorized operations [1]. More worryingly, even these simple mechanisms often have flawed implementations, allowing malicious actors to bypass them [6]. this talk, I will discuss several findings from our research into vulnerabilities in network protocol implementations of IoT, OT and IT systems, giving special attention to those stemming from flawed authentication and access control implementations. Examples include buffer overflows when processing user credentials, use of weak cryptography, credentials transmitted in plaintext, hardcoded credentials, authentication bypasses via MAC or IP spoofing, client-side authentication, missing critical steps in authentication, insufficient session expiration and message parsing before establishing a peer's identity. These issues were identified in implementations as diverse as embedded TCP/IP stacks [2,3], routing suites and engineering protocols for OT devices from major vendors [9]. This type of vulnerability enables attackers to take devices offline, manipulate their operational parameters, and in many cases execute arbitrary code. I will also present statistics from a set of OT- and IoT-specific honeypots about attacks exploiting authentication bypasses, brute forcing passwords and leaking credentials. These statistics show that the most common initial access technique for these systems consist of the exploitation of remote management protocols by guessing or leaking either generic or application-specific credentials [4]. Finally, I will discuss the importance of collaborative threat intelligence and modern network access control as methods to prevent, detect and respond to such attacks [5].
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