DAPA的合宪性第二部分:忠实执行法律

J. Blackman
{"title":"DAPA的合宪性第二部分:忠实执行法律","authors":"J. Blackman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2545558","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Article II imposes a duty on the President unlike any other in the Constitution: he “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” More precisely, it imposes four distinct but interconnected duties. First, the imperative “shall” commands the president to execute the laws. Second, in doing so the President must act with “care.” Third, the object of that duty is “the Laws” enacted by Congress. Fourth, in executing the laws with care, the President must act in good “faith.” A careful examination of the four elements of the “Take Care” clause provides a comprehensive framework to determine whether the Executive has complied with his constitutional duty. This article assesses the constitutionality of President Obama's “Deferred Action for Parental Accountability” (DAPA) on immigration through this lens of the “Take Care” clause.First, DAPA is an extremely “broad policy” that was “consciously and expressly adopted” not as a means to enforce the laws of Congress, but to exempt nearly 40% of undocumented aliens in the United States-even those who were not previously subject to any previous enforcement action-from the threat of removal, and to provide them with work authorization. Second, DAPA was implemented without “care” for the immigration laws as it displaced officer discretion, both procedurally and substantively, with the Secretary's blanket policy to turn meaningful review into a “rubber stamp.” Third, DAPA finds refuge in none of the three tiers identified in Justice Jackson's opinion Youngstown. Congress has and continues to oppose the scope of this executive action. Further, DAPA is not consonant with long-standing congressional policy towards deferred action. Previous uses were typically ancillary to statutory grants of lawful status or responsive to extraordinary equities on a very limited scale. In this bottom rung of authority, presidential power is at its “lowest ebb,” unentitled to a presumption of constitutionality. Fourth DAPA was not a good faith mistake of law, but a bad faith deliberate deviation. Implementing executive action to achieve several of the key statutory goals of laws Congress voted against reflects a deliberate attempt to circumnavigate around an uncooperative legislature. Exacerbating this conclusion is the fact that prior to the defeats of DACA and DAPA, the “sole organ” of the Executive Branch consistently stated that he lacked the power to defer the deportations of millions by himself.This pattern of behavior amounts to a deliberate effort to act not in good faith, but in an effort to undermine the Laws of Congress. The duty under Article II has been violated.Part I of this series addresses whether Congress has acquiesced to deferred action. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 Georgetown Law Journal Online (Forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2545544.","PeriodicalId":387942,"journal":{"name":"Texas Review of Law and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law\",\"authors\":\"J. Blackman\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2545558\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Article II imposes a duty on the President unlike any other in the Constitution: he “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” More precisely, it imposes four distinct but interconnected duties. First, the imperative “shall” commands the president to execute the laws. Second, in doing so the President must act with “care.” Third, the object of that duty is “the Laws” enacted by Congress. Fourth, in executing the laws with care, the President must act in good “faith.” A careful examination of the four elements of the “Take Care” clause provides a comprehensive framework to determine whether the Executive has complied with his constitutional duty. This article assesses the constitutionality of President Obama's “Deferred Action for Parental Accountability” (DAPA) on immigration through this lens of the “Take Care” clause.First, DAPA is an extremely “broad policy” that was “consciously and expressly adopted” not as a means to enforce the laws of Congress, but to exempt nearly 40% of undocumented aliens in the United States-even those who were not previously subject to any previous enforcement action-from the threat of removal, and to provide them with work authorization. Second, DAPA was implemented without “care” for the immigration laws as it displaced officer discretion, both procedurally and substantively, with the Secretary's blanket policy to turn meaningful review into a “rubber stamp.” Third, DAPA finds refuge in none of the three tiers identified in Justice Jackson's opinion Youngstown. Congress has and continues to oppose the scope of this executive action. Further, DAPA is not consonant with long-standing congressional policy towards deferred action. Previous uses were typically ancillary to statutory grants of lawful status or responsive to extraordinary equities on a very limited scale. In this bottom rung of authority, presidential power is at its “lowest ebb,” unentitled to a presumption of constitutionality. Fourth DAPA was not a good faith mistake of law, but a bad faith deliberate deviation. Implementing executive action to achieve several of the key statutory goals of laws Congress voted against reflects a deliberate attempt to circumnavigate around an uncooperative legislature. Exacerbating this conclusion is the fact that prior to the defeats of DACA and DAPA, the “sole organ” of the Executive Branch consistently stated that he lacked the power to defer the deportations of millions by himself.This pattern of behavior amounts to a deliberate effort to act not in good faith, but in an effort to undermine the Laws of Congress. The duty under Article II has been violated.Part I of this series addresses whether Congress has acquiesced to deferred action. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 Georgetown Law Journal Online (Forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2545544.\",\"PeriodicalId\":387942,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Texas Review of Law and Politics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-01-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Texas Review of Law and Politics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2545558\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Texas Review of Law and Politics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2545558","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7

摘要

宪法第二条赋予总统一项不同于其他宪法条款的职责:他“应注意法律的忠实执行”。更准确地说,它规定了四种不同但相互关联的职责。首先,命令式的“应当”命令总统执行法律。其次,在这样做时,总统必须“谨慎”行事。第三,这项义务的对象是国会制定的“法律”。第四,在谨慎执行法律时,总统必须本着“善意”行事。仔细研究“小心”条款的四个要素,可提供一个全面的框架,以确定行政长官是否履行了其宪制职责。本文从“照顾”条款的角度,对奥巴马总统的移民“父母责任暂缓行动”(DAPA)的合宪性进行了评估。首先,DAPA是一项极其“宽泛的政策”,它“有意识和明确地采用”,而不是作为执行国会法律的手段,而是为了使美国近40%的无证外国人——即使是那些以前没有受到任何执法行动约束的人——免于被驱逐出境的威胁,并为他们提供工作许可。其次,DAPA的实施没有“顾及”移民法,因为它在程序上和实质上都取代了官员的自由裁量权,部长的一揽子政策将有意义的审查变成了“橡皮图章”。第三,DAPA在杰克逊法官扬斯敦的意见中所确定的三个层次中都找不到庇护。国会已经并将继续反对这一行政行动的范围。此外,DAPA与国会长期以来的推迟行动政策不一致。以前的用途通常是辅助法定授予的合法地位,或在非常有限的规模上响应特别股权。在这个权力的最底层,总统的权力处于“最低谷”,没有资格被推定为符合宪法。第四,DAPA不是善意的法律错误,而是恶意的故意偏离。实施行政行动来实现国会投票反对的法律的几个关键法定目标,反映了一种蓄意绕过不合作立法机构的企图。在DACA和DAPA失败之前,行政部门的“唯一机构”一直声称他没有权力自行推迟驱逐数百万人,这一事实加剧了这一结论。这种行为模式相当于故意采取行动,而不是出于善意,而是为了破坏国会的法律。违反了第二条规定的义务。本系列的第一部分讨论国会是否默许推迟行动。Josh Blackman, DAPA第一部分的合宪性:国会默许延期行动,103乔治城法律杂志在线(即将出版2015),可在http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2545544。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law
Article II imposes a duty on the President unlike any other in the Constitution: he “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” More precisely, it imposes four distinct but interconnected duties. First, the imperative “shall” commands the president to execute the laws. Second, in doing so the President must act with “care.” Third, the object of that duty is “the Laws” enacted by Congress. Fourth, in executing the laws with care, the President must act in good “faith.” A careful examination of the four elements of the “Take Care” clause provides a comprehensive framework to determine whether the Executive has complied with his constitutional duty. This article assesses the constitutionality of President Obama's “Deferred Action for Parental Accountability” (DAPA) on immigration through this lens of the “Take Care” clause.First, DAPA is an extremely “broad policy” that was “consciously and expressly adopted” not as a means to enforce the laws of Congress, but to exempt nearly 40% of undocumented aliens in the United States-even those who were not previously subject to any previous enforcement action-from the threat of removal, and to provide them with work authorization. Second, DAPA was implemented without “care” for the immigration laws as it displaced officer discretion, both procedurally and substantively, with the Secretary's blanket policy to turn meaningful review into a “rubber stamp.” Third, DAPA finds refuge in none of the three tiers identified in Justice Jackson's opinion Youngstown. Congress has and continues to oppose the scope of this executive action. Further, DAPA is not consonant with long-standing congressional policy towards deferred action. Previous uses were typically ancillary to statutory grants of lawful status or responsive to extraordinary equities on a very limited scale. In this bottom rung of authority, presidential power is at its “lowest ebb,” unentitled to a presumption of constitutionality. Fourth DAPA was not a good faith mistake of law, but a bad faith deliberate deviation. Implementing executive action to achieve several of the key statutory goals of laws Congress voted against reflects a deliberate attempt to circumnavigate around an uncooperative legislature. Exacerbating this conclusion is the fact that prior to the defeats of DACA and DAPA, the “sole organ” of the Executive Branch consistently stated that he lacked the power to defer the deportations of millions by himself.This pattern of behavior amounts to a deliberate effort to act not in good faith, but in an effort to undermine the Laws of Congress. The duty under Article II has been violated.Part I of this series addresses whether Congress has acquiesced to deferred action. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 Georgetown Law Journal Online (Forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2545544.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信