通过逻辑锁定实现的硬件木马弹性分析

Jonathan Cruz, Pravin Gaikwad, S. Bhunia
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引用次数: 0

摘要

由于水平业务模式,对硬件知识产权(IP)机密性的新威胁以盗版、逆向工程和提取设计秘密的形式出现。这些威胁导致了有前途的IP保护解决方案的发展,其中包括逻辑锁定和硬件混淆。虽然逻辑锁定主要是为了保护硬件IP的机密性而开发的,但它还可以提供其他安全好处,这些好处不仅限于IP盗窃,还可以保护设计完整性,防止恶意设计修改,即硬件特洛伊木马攻击。硬件木马攻击是通过在设计中插入隐形的恶意逻辑来实现的,通常在很少的情况下被激活,从而逃避检测。现有的针对木马攻击的对策主要是通过针对性的验证方法检测攻击,或者通过设计解决方案进行预防。在本文中,我们提出了一个调查的作用,最先进的逻辑锁定方法,以防止硬件木马攻击。我们讨论了逻辑锁定的有益属性,这些属性有助于防止特洛伊木马并显著降低其有效性。我们引入度量来描述和量化这些现象。通过广泛的实验验证和实际的特洛伊木马插入,我们表明,平均有效的逻辑锁定可以使特洛伊木马激活成功率降低约87%,并使成功插入的特洛伊木马激活概率增加约1000倍。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Analysis of Hardware Trojan Resilience Enabled through Logic Locking
Emerging threats to hardware Intellectual Property (IP) confidentiality due to the horizontal business model have come in the form of piracy, reverse engineering, and extraction of design secrets. These threats have led to the development of promising IP protection solutions, which include logic locking and hardware obfuscation. While logic locking has been mainly developed for protecting confidentiality of hardware IPs, it may also provide other security benefits that extend beyond IP theft and into defending design integrity against malicious design modifications, referred to as hardware Trojan attacks. Hardware Trojan attacks are realized through insertion of stealthy malicious logic in a design, often activated under rare conditions, so as to evade detection. Existing countermeasures against Trojan attacks primarily focus on detection of an attack through targeted verification approach or its prevention through design solutions. In this paper, we present an investigation on the role of state-of-the-art logic locking methods for protecting against hardware Trojan attacks. We discuss beneficial attributes of logic locking that can contribute to Trojan prevention and significant reduction in its efficacy. We introduce metrics to describe and quantify these phenomena. Through extensive experimental validation and practical Trojan insertion, we show that on average effective logic locking can offer around 87% reduction in Trojan activation success and around 1000x increase in Trojan activation probability of those successfully inserted.
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