中欧、东欧和新独立国家小额信贷机构的治理和绩效

Valentina Hartarska
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引用次数: 480

摘要

本文首次提出了外部治理机制、董事会多样性和独立性以及管理层薪酬对中东欧和新独立国家小额信贷机构外延和可持续性影响的证据。结果表明,在外部治理机制中,只有审计影响外延,而监管和评级不影响绩效。董事会的多样性提高了外联性和可持续性,而更大、更不独立的董事会则降低了可持续性。基于绩效的薪酬不能有效地协调管理者和利益相关者的利益,而薪酬过低的管理者会减少外延。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States
This paper presents the first evidence on the impact of external governance mechanisms, board diversity and independence, and management compensation on outreach and sustainability of microfinance institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. Results indicate that among external governance mechanisms only auditing affects outreach, whereas regulation and rating do not affect performance. Board diversity improves both outreach and sustainability while larger and less independent boards lower sustainability. Performance-based compensation is not effective in aligning the interest of managers and stakeholders, and underpaying managers reduces outreach.
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