{"title":"基于基准分解的竞争分析","authors":"Ning Chen, N. Gravin, P. Lu","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764491","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter of the model and study a broad class of functions instead of a individual target benchmark. We consider a multitude of well-studied auction settings, and improve upon a few previous results. Multi-unit auctions. Given a β-competitive unlimited supply auction, the best previously known multi-unit auction is 2β-competitive. We design a (1+β)-competitive auction reducing the ratio from 4.84 to 3.24. These results carry over to matroid and position auctions. General downward-closed environments. We design a 6.5-competitive auction improving upon the ratio of 7.5. Our auction is noticeably simpler than the previous best one. Unlimited supply online auctions. Our analysis yields an auction with a competitive ratio of 4.12, which significantly narrows the margin of [4, 4.84] previously known for this problem. A particularly important tool in our analysis is a simple decomposition lemma, which allows us to bound the competitive ratio against a sum of benchmark functions. We use this lemma in a \"divide and conquer\" fashion by dividing the target benchmark into the sum of simpler functions.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Competitive Analysis via Benchmark Decomposition\",\"authors\":\"Ning Chen, N. Gravin, P. Lu\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2764468.2764491\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter of the model and study a broad class of functions instead of a individual target benchmark. We consider a multitude of well-studied auction settings, and improve upon a few previous results. Multi-unit auctions. Given a β-competitive unlimited supply auction, the best previously known multi-unit auction is 2β-competitive. We design a (1+β)-competitive auction reducing the ratio from 4.84 to 3.24. These results carry over to matroid and position auctions. General downward-closed environments. We design a 6.5-competitive auction improving upon the ratio of 7.5. Our auction is noticeably simpler than the previous best one. Unlimited supply online auctions. Our analysis yields an auction with a competitive ratio of 4.12, which significantly narrows the margin of [4, 4.84] previously known for this problem. A particularly important tool in our analysis is a simple decomposition lemma, which allows us to bound the competitive ratio against a sum of benchmark functions. We use this lemma in a \\\"divide and conquer\\\" fashion by dividing the target benchmark into the sum of simpler functions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":376992,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"volume\":\"29 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-11-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764491\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764491","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter of the model and study a broad class of functions instead of a individual target benchmark. We consider a multitude of well-studied auction settings, and improve upon a few previous results. Multi-unit auctions. Given a β-competitive unlimited supply auction, the best previously known multi-unit auction is 2β-competitive. We design a (1+β)-competitive auction reducing the ratio from 4.84 to 3.24. These results carry over to matroid and position auctions. General downward-closed environments. We design a 6.5-competitive auction improving upon the ratio of 7.5. Our auction is noticeably simpler than the previous best one. Unlimited supply online auctions. Our analysis yields an auction with a competitive ratio of 4.12, which significantly narrows the margin of [4, 4.84] previously known for this problem. A particularly important tool in our analysis is a simple decomposition lemma, which allows us to bound the competitive ratio against a sum of benchmark functions. We use this lemma in a "divide and conquer" fashion by dividing the target benchmark into the sum of simpler functions.