{"title":"优势银行之间的隐性串通:来自圆场贷款定价的证据","authors":"Yu-Ju Chan, Chih-Yung Lin, Tse-Chun Lin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3905375","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While there is no apparent reason for loan spreads to cluster at certain numbers, we find that around 70% of loans have round-yard spreads (i.e., multiples of 25 basis points). We hypothesize that dominant banks implicitly collude by using the round-yards as focal pricing points when negotiating with their borrowers. The tacit collusion leads to higher spreads and total costs of the round-yard-priced loans than non-round-yard-priced loans. Consistent with our tacit collusion hypothesis, dominant banks round up rather than round down loan spreads to the multiples of yards. Moreover, round-yard pricing is more prevalent among lower-quality and non-repeat borrowers. Overall, we provide the first evidence that dominant banks use round-yard pricing as an effective tool for tacit collusion in the loan market.","PeriodicalId":127551,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Valuation","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Tacit Collusion among Dominant Banks: Evidence from Round-Yard Loan Pricing\",\"authors\":\"Yu-Ju Chan, Chih-Yung Lin, Tse-Chun Lin\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3905375\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"While there is no apparent reason for loan spreads to cluster at certain numbers, we find that around 70% of loans have round-yard spreads (i.e., multiples of 25 basis points). We hypothesize that dominant banks implicitly collude by using the round-yards as focal pricing points when negotiating with their borrowers. The tacit collusion leads to higher spreads and total costs of the round-yard-priced loans than non-round-yard-priced loans. Consistent with our tacit collusion hypothesis, dominant banks round up rather than round down loan spreads to the multiples of yards. Moreover, round-yard pricing is more prevalent among lower-quality and non-repeat borrowers. Overall, we provide the first evidence that dominant banks use round-yard pricing as an effective tool for tacit collusion in the loan market.\",\"PeriodicalId\":127551,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Finance: Valuation\",\"volume\":\"85 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Finance: Valuation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3905375\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Finance: Valuation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3905375","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Tacit Collusion among Dominant Banks: Evidence from Round-Yard Loan Pricing
While there is no apparent reason for loan spreads to cluster at certain numbers, we find that around 70% of loans have round-yard spreads (i.e., multiples of 25 basis points). We hypothesize that dominant banks implicitly collude by using the round-yards as focal pricing points when negotiating with their borrowers. The tacit collusion leads to higher spreads and total costs of the round-yard-priced loans than non-round-yard-priced loans. Consistent with our tacit collusion hypothesis, dominant banks round up rather than round down loan spreads to the multiples of yards. Moreover, round-yard pricing is more prevalent among lower-quality and non-repeat borrowers. Overall, we provide the first evidence that dominant banks use round-yard pricing as an effective tool for tacit collusion in the loan market.