法律授权:项目资助逻辑的恶性循环

Paul Daniel Rivera
{"title":"法律授权:项目资助逻辑的恶性循环","authors":"Paul Daniel Rivera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1673552","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Millions of dollars of international aid is given to developing countries each year to strengthen “rule-of-law” institutions. Led by institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the majority of international legal aid rests on the assumption that market and investment friendly legal systems – protecting foreign and domestic investment, property and contract rights – will spur economic growth that in turn, will “trickle down” to the poor in the name of poverty alleviation. However, even after over two decades of these institutional legal reforms, little evidence has emerged supporting the impact that these reforms have had on poverty alleviation.From the frustrations of international legal development practitioners who have witnessed the real gaps between this top-down institutional approach and poverty alleviation emerged the field of legal empowerment. A promising alternative, it is a bottom-up approach aiming to afford poor and disadvantaged populations legal advice and services under the belief that once knowledgeable about their legal rights, these groups may take more control of their lives and lift themselves from the strains of poverty. At the moment, a huge imbalance exists between the amount of funding given to institutional reforms and those given to legal empowerment type projects. This imbalance needs to change, but is seemingly troubled by a vicious cycle of funding logic. International aid institutions like the World Bank and the IMF hesitate to grant long-term development loans unless impact is shown or looks promising. This is usually determined by looking at the impact of short-term developmental loans, which often act as a preliminary indicator of a projects tangible impact or promise. Herein lies the fundamental tension such a short-term, impact-oriented approach has with legal empowerment, which is by nature, a long-term process. In fact, sustained funding is often a predicate to the success of a legal empowerment intervention. This is because legal empowerment targets the “users” of the law and not the institutions. Whereas institutional reform may often be perceived as a more attractive option because it can point to tangible results like how many courts have been built, how many cases have been adjudicated, and number of judicial officers trained, this is often indeterminate of who is using the judicial channels and for what purpose. It’s possible that, for example, such cases actually involved wealthy corporations or individuals that disenfranchised the poor. In such cases, one must question whether poverty alleviation is really taking place. On the other hand, legal empowerment targets the poor and disadvantaged. It’s a long-term process because it seeks to educate these groups of their rights from the ground-up and that demands patience. In addition, these groups face deeply engrained cultures and socio-economic barriers making impact that more challenging. Thus, short-term tangible impact is hard to measure, thereby leaving funding of legal empowerment projects to receive only a small portion of developmental loans given. In practice, however, it’s often more desirable because it seeks to empower the poor and engrain within them a sustainable notion of rights and justice. Without this foundation that legal empowerment initiatives attempt to give rise to, these legal institutions cannot effectively alleviate property and inevitably, “courts are just buildings, judges just public employees, and constitutions just pieces of paper.” This paper examines this vicious cycle of funding logic and proposes that international lending institutions be mindful of legal empowerment’s requirement for long-term funding even if short-term impact is unclear. This is because it may inevitably be a more viable solution to poverty alleviation than mere institutional reform. Part I of this paper begins by examining the philosophical differences between rule-of-law and legal empowerment. It continues by listing a common core of legal empowerment characteristics along with the methodology for measurement and evaluation. In Part II, this paper describes select legal empowerment studies funded by international banks and aid agencies. It attempts to illustrate how legal empowerment interventions are formulated and implemented, along with describing the impact or discoveries from those interventions along the way. Part III concludes by attempting to frame the current funding framework as applicable to legal empowerment as unrealistic and impractical. It provides some context to that position by identifying the cultural barriers to change and describes why other intangible information may be more valuable. Finally, it ends by describing the possible economic benefits of legal empowerment and how increased funding will only improve the quality of the research.","PeriodicalId":375754,"journal":{"name":"Public International Law eJournal","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Legal Empowerment: The Vicious Cycle of Logic in Project Funding\",\"authors\":\"Paul Daniel Rivera\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1673552\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Millions of dollars of international aid is given to developing countries each year to strengthen “rule-of-law” institutions. Led by institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the majority of international legal aid rests on the assumption that market and investment friendly legal systems – protecting foreign and domestic investment, property and contract rights – will spur economic growth that in turn, will “trickle down” to the poor in the name of poverty alleviation. However, even after over two decades of these institutional legal reforms, little evidence has emerged supporting the impact that these reforms have had on poverty alleviation.From the frustrations of international legal development practitioners who have witnessed the real gaps between this top-down institutional approach and poverty alleviation emerged the field of legal empowerment. A promising alternative, it is a bottom-up approach aiming to afford poor and disadvantaged populations legal advice and services under the belief that once knowledgeable about their legal rights, these groups may take more control of their lives and lift themselves from the strains of poverty. At the moment, a huge imbalance exists between the amount of funding given to institutional reforms and those given to legal empowerment type projects. This imbalance needs to change, but is seemingly troubled by a vicious cycle of funding logic. International aid institutions like the World Bank and the IMF hesitate to grant long-term development loans unless impact is shown or looks promising. This is usually determined by looking at the impact of short-term developmental loans, which often act as a preliminary indicator of a projects tangible impact or promise. Herein lies the fundamental tension such a short-term, impact-oriented approach has with legal empowerment, which is by nature, a long-term process. In fact, sustained funding is often a predicate to the success of a legal empowerment intervention. This is because legal empowerment targets the “users” of the law and not the institutions. Whereas institutional reform may often be perceived as a more attractive option because it can point to tangible results like how many courts have been built, how many cases have been adjudicated, and number of judicial officers trained, this is often indeterminate of who is using the judicial channels and for what purpose. It’s possible that, for example, such cases actually involved wealthy corporations or individuals that disenfranchised the poor. In such cases, one must question whether poverty alleviation is really taking place. On the other hand, legal empowerment targets the poor and disadvantaged. It’s a long-term process because it seeks to educate these groups of their rights from the ground-up and that demands patience. In addition, these groups face deeply engrained cultures and socio-economic barriers making impact that more challenging. Thus, short-term tangible impact is hard to measure, thereby leaving funding of legal empowerment projects to receive only a small portion of developmental loans given. In practice, however, it’s often more desirable because it seeks to empower the poor and engrain within them a sustainable notion of rights and justice. Without this foundation that legal empowerment initiatives attempt to give rise to, these legal institutions cannot effectively alleviate property and inevitably, “courts are just buildings, judges just public employees, and constitutions just pieces of paper.” This paper examines this vicious cycle of funding logic and proposes that international lending institutions be mindful of legal empowerment’s requirement for long-term funding even if short-term impact is unclear. This is because it may inevitably be a more viable solution to poverty alleviation than mere institutional reform. Part I of this paper begins by examining the philosophical differences between rule-of-law and legal empowerment. It continues by listing a common core of legal empowerment characteristics along with the methodology for measurement and evaluation. In Part II, this paper describes select legal empowerment studies funded by international banks and aid agencies. It attempts to illustrate how legal empowerment interventions are formulated and implemented, along with describing the impact or discoveries from those interventions along the way. Part III concludes by attempting to frame the current funding framework as applicable to legal empowerment as unrealistic and impractical. It provides some context to that position by identifying the cultural barriers to change and describes why other intangible information may be more valuable. Finally, it ends by describing the possible economic benefits of legal empowerment and how increased funding will only improve the quality of the research.\",\"PeriodicalId\":375754,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Public International Law eJournal\",\"volume\":\"91 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-05-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Public International Law eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1673552\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Public International Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1673552","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

每年向发展中国家提供数百万美元的国际援助,以加强“法治”制度。在世界银行和国际货币基金组织等机构的领导下,大多数国际法律援助都是基于这样一种假设,即市场和投资友好型法律制度——保护国内外投资、财产和合同权利——将刺激经济增长,进而以减轻贫困的名义“涓滴效应”惠及穷人。然而,即使在这些机构法律改革进行了二十多年之后,几乎没有证据表明这些改革对减轻贫困产生了影响。国际法律发展从业人员目睹了这种自上而下的体制办法与减轻贫困之间的真正差距,从他们的挫折中出现了赋予法律权力的领域。这是一种有希望的替代办法,它是一种自下而上的办法,旨在向贫穷和处境不利的人口提供法律咨询和服务,相信一旦了解了他们的法律权利,这些群体就可以更好地控制自己的生活,使自己摆脱贫困的压力。目前,用于机构改革的资金与用于法律赋权类项目的资金之间存在巨大的不平衡。这种不平衡需要改变,但似乎受到资助逻辑恶性循环的困扰。世界银行(World Bank)和国际货币基金组织(IMF)等国际援助机构在提供长期发展贷款方面犹豫不决,除非这些贷款显示出或看起来有希望产生影响。这通常是通过观察短期发展贷款的影响来确定的,短期发展贷款通常作为项目实际影响或承诺的初步指标。这就是这种短期的、以影响为导向的方法与法律授权之间的根本紧张关系,法律授权本质上是一个长期的过程。事实上,持续的资金往往是法律赋权干预成功的先决条件。这是因为法律授权针对的是法律的“使用者”,而不是机构。虽然机构改革往往被认为是一个更有吸引力的选择,因为它可以指出具体的结果,如建立了多少法院,裁决了多少案件,培训了多少司法官员,但这往往是不确定的,谁在使用司法渠道,为了什么目的。例如,这类案件实际上可能涉及剥夺穷人公民权的富有公司或个人。在这种情况下,人们必须质疑是否真的在减轻贫困。另一方面,法律赋权针对的是穷人和弱势群体。这是一个长期的过程,因为它试图从头开始教育这些群体他们的权利,这需要耐心。此外,这些群体面临着根深蒂固的文化和社会经济障碍,这使得影响更具挑战性。因此,短期的实际影响难以衡量,从而使法律授权项目的资金只占所提供发展贷款的一小部分。然而,在实践中,它往往更可取,因为它寻求赋予穷人权力,并在他们心中灌输可持续的权利和正义观念。如果没有这种法律赋权倡议试图建立的基础,这些法律制度就无法有效地减轻财产负担,并且不可避免地“法院只是建筑物,法官只是公务员,宪法只是一纸空文”。本文考察了这种融资逻辑的恶性循环,并建议国际贷款机构注意法律授权对长期融资的要求,即使短期影响尚不清楚。这是因为它可能不可避免地是一种比单纯的体制改革更可行的减轻贫穷的解决办法。本文的第一部分首先考察了法治与法律赋权之间的哲学差异。它继续列出法律授权特征的共同核心以及衡量和评价的方法。在第二部分中,本文描述了由国际银行和援助机构资助的法律授权研究。它试图说明法律授权干预措施是如何制定和实施的,同时描述这些干预措施的影响或发现。第三部分最后试图把目前适用于法律授权的供资框架说成是不现实和不切实际的。它通过识别变革的文化障碍提供了一些背景,并描述了为什么其他无形信息可能更有价值。最后,它以描述法律授权可能带来的经济利益以及增加资金如何只会提高研究质量作为结束。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Legal Empowerment: The Vicious Cycle of Logic in Project Funding
Millions of dollars of international aid is given to developing countries each year to strengthen “rule-of-law” institutions. Led by institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the majority of international legal aid rests on the assumption that market and investment friendly legal systems – protecting foreign and domestic investment, property and contract rights – will spur economic growth that in turn, will “trickle down” to the poor in the name of poverty alleviation. However, even after over two decades of these institutional legal reforms, little evidence has emerged supporting the impact that these reforms have had on poverty alleviation.From the frustrations of international legal development practitioners who have witnessed the real gaps between this top-down institutional approach and poverty alleviation emerged the field of legal empowerment. A promising alternative, it is a bottom-up approach aiming to afford poor and disadvantaged populations legal advice and services under the belief that once knowledgeable about their legal rights, these groups may take more control of their lives and lift themselves from the strains of poverty. At the moment, a huge imbalance exists between the amount of funding given to institutional reforms and those given to legal empowerment type projects. This imbalance needs to change, but is seemingly troubled by a vicious cycle of funding logic. International aid institutions like the World Bank and the IMF hesitate to grant long-term development loans unless impact is shown or looks promising. This is usually determined by looking at the impact of short-term developmental loans, which often act as a preliminary indicator of a projects tangible impact or promise. Herein lies the fundamental tension such a short-term, impact-oriented approach has with legal empowerment, which is by nature, a long-term process. In fact, sustained funding is often a predicate to the success of a legal empowerment intervention. This is because legal empowerment targets the “users” of the law and not the institutions. Whereas institutional reform may often be perceived as a more attractive option because it can point to tangible results like how many courts have been built, how many cases have been adjudicated, and number of judicial officers trained, this is often indeterminate of who is using the judicial channels and for what purpose. It’s possible that, for example, such cases actually involved wealthy corporations or individuals that disenfranchised the poor. In such cases, one must question whether poverty alleviation is really taking place. On the other hand, legal empowerment targets the poor and disadvantaged. It’s a long-term process because it seeks to educate these groups of their rights from the ground-up and that demands patience. In addition, these groups face deeply engrained cultures and socio-economic barriers making impact that more challenging. Thus, short-term tangible impact is hard to measure, thereby leaving funding of legal empowerment projects to receive only a small portion of developmental loans given. In practice, however, it’s often more desirable because it seeks to empower the poor and engrain within them a sustainable notion of rights and justice. Without this foundation that legal empowerment initiatives attempt to give rise to, these legal institutions cannot effectively alleviate property and inevitably, “courts are just buildings, judges just public employees, and constitutions just pieces of paper.” This paper examines this vicious cycle of funding logic and proposes that international lending institutions be mindful of legal empowerment’s requirement for long-term funding even if short-term impact is unclear. This is because it may inevitably be a more viable solution to poverty alleviation than mere institutional reform. Part I of this paper begins by examining the philosophical differences between rule-of-law and legal empowerment. It continues by listing a common core of legal empowerment characteristics along with the methodology for measurement and evaluation. In Part II, this paper describes select legal empowerment studies funded by international banks and aid agencies. It attempts to illustrate how legal empowerment interventions are formulated and implemented, along with describing the impact or discoveries from those interventions along the way. Part III concludes by attempting to frame the current funding framework as applicable to legal empowerment as unrealistic and impractical. It provides some context to that position by identifying the cultural barriers to change and describes why other intangible information may be more valuable. Finally, it ends by describing the possible economic benefits of legal empowerment and how increased funding will only improve the quality of the research.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信