想象是创造力的种子

Rebecca J. M. Gotlieb, Elizabeth Hyde, Mary Helen Immordino‐Yang, S. Kaufman
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引用次数: 8

摘要

在创造力的各个领域和复杂程度上,有一项基本技能使创造力成为可能。没有想象力,就没有创造力。本章探讨了想象力和创造力共同的认知和情感过程,提出了前者与其他个人因素(如专业知识、个性、动机以及环境支持)一起使后者得以实现的观点(S. B. Kaufman & Gregoire, 2015;Seligman, Forgeard, & Kaufman, 2016;Sternberg & Lubart, 1991)。想象力广义上指的是人类对目前不存在于感官中的事物构建心理表征的能力(Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2009;Seligman et al., 2016)。我们有意或无意地、单独或集体地从事想象性思维。在社会情感和时间领域,有许多形式的想象思维,包括换位思考、身份建构、建设性的内部反思、基于对多元文化的理解而进行的思考、假装游戏、展望、记忆建构、反事实思维和走神(Abraham, 2016;Runco & Pina, 2013)。许多形式的想象——尤其是对人,包括对自己,跨越时间和空间的想象——很大程度上依赖于大脑的默认模式网络,这个网络由沿大脑额叶和顶叶中线的几个大脑区域组成,包括内侧前额叶皮层、内侧顶叶皮层、外侧顶叶皮层以及内侧和外侧颞叶皮层内的区域(Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & spring, 2014;Immordino-Yang, Christodoulou, & Singh, 2012;Raichle & Snyder, 2007;Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007;spring & Andrews-Hana, 2015;Tamir & Mitchell, 2011)。其他形式的想象,包括可视化物理物体或物理空间,被认为更需要大脑的执行注意网络和背侧注意网络,这是一个涉及额叶视野和顶叶内沟之间交流的网络(Andrews-Hanna等人,2014;Jack et al., 2013)。对支持想象力思维的大脑网络的理解可以帮助阐明想象力结构的限制。不管特定的大规模大脑网络与特定形式的想象的相互作用,我们看到
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Imagination Is the Seed of Creativity
Across domains and levels of sophistication of creativity, there is one fundamental skill that makes creativity possible. Without imagination, there can be no creativity. This chapter explores cognitive and affective processes common to both imagination and creativity, advancing the argument that the former enables the latter in conjunction with other personal factors such as expertise, personality, and motivation, as well as environmental support (S. B. Kaufman & Gregoire, 2015; Seligman, Forgeard, & Kaufman, 2016; Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Imagination refers broadly to the human capacity to construct a mental representation of that which is not currently present to the senses (Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2009; Seligman et al., 2016). We engage in imaginative thought both intentionally and unintentionally and both solitarily and collectively. Across social-emotional and temporal domains, there are a number of forms of imaginative thought, including perspective-taking, identity construction, constructive internal reflection, thinking informed by an understanding of multiple cultures, pretend play, prospection, memory construction, counterfactual thinking, and mind-wandering (Abraham, 2016; Runco & Pina, 2013). Many forms of imagination – especially imagination about people, including oneself, across time and space – draw heavily on the brain’s default mode network, a network composed of several brain regions along the midline of the brain in the frontal and parietal lobes, including the medial prefrontal cortex, medial parietal cortex, lateral parietal cortex, and regions within the medial and lateral temporal cortex (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Immordino-Yang, Christodoulou, & Singh, 2012; Raichle & Snyder, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Spreng & Andrews-Hana, 2015; Tamir & Mitchell, 2011). Other forms of imagination that involve visualizing physical objects or physical space are thought to recruit more heavily the brain’s executive attention network and dorsal attention network, a network involving communication between the frontal eye fields and the intraparietal sulcus (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Jack et al., 2013). An understanding of the brain networks that support imaginative thought can help elucidate the confines of the imagination construct. Regardless of the specific largescale brain network interactions involved with specific forms of imagination, we see
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