基于三方博弈的网约车平台监管机制研究

Weiye Luo
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引用次数: 1

摘要

近年来,网约车在中国已经成为一种非常流行的出行方式。为了给政府提供决策支持,使网约车行业更好地发展,本文基于博弈论建立了政府、网约车平台和消费者之间的数学模型。通过分析纳什均衡和混合策略纳什均衡的八种策略,可以发现政府应该制定安全规范,实施奖惩制度,明确平台和消费者的责任,加强宣传,以保持行业的稳定发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Research on Oversight Mechanisms of Online Car-Hailing Platforms Based on Three-Party Game
Online car-hailing has become a very popular travel mode in China in recent years. In order to provide decision support for government so that the car-hailing industry can develop better, the present paper built a mathematical model among the government, online car-hailing platforms and consumers based on game theory. After analyzing the eight strategies of Nash equilibrium and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, it has been found that the government is supposed to make safety codes, conduct rewards and punishment system, define responsibility for both platforms and consumers clearly and enhance publicity to keep the industry developing steadily.
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