诗中的视觉:在浪漫的梦境视觉中书写视觉

A. O'connell
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They were a representation for the outside world of what lies inside that otherwise exclusive state of the dreaming mind. Some of the best-known Romantic dream visions, among them Samuel Taylor Coleridge's \"Kubla Khan,\" John Keats's The Fall of Hyperion, and Percy Bysshe Shelley's The Triumph of Life, as discussed here, attempt to take up this challenge and seek to communicate the inspired visions that lie at the heart of the original creative idea. In The Fall of Hyperion, Keats embraces this role for the poet, claiming \"poesy alone can tell her dreams\" (8). However, like many Romantic dream visions that reflect on their own creation, the poem is keenly aware of one crucial problem inherent in this process: language. Before the twentieth century, ideas, thoughts, and inspired moments were all thought to be visual, not linguistic. To take creative ideas from the imaginative mind and communicate them with the world through poetry involved a transformation from the visual to the linguistic, from visions into verse. In the Romantic period the creative vision in the mind could refer to the inner experience of any of a range of imaginative states, from thoughts and ideas to the vision that is imagined when reading, composing poetry, daydreaming, in reverie, madness, or sleeping dreams. This is what Alan Richardson refers to in \"Reimagining the Romantic Imagination,\" borrowing neuroscience's current terminology, as \"the default mode.\" For Richardson, memory, prospective \"future thinking,\" daydreaming, nocturnal dreaming, and theory of mind or mind reading are linked in Romantic brain science as what scientists might now call defaulting, but which was understood in the Romantic period as various ways of imagining (389). When Romantic poets explore these states of mind, they understand them as a spectrum of liminal imaginative states. Shelley and Coleridge both argue that the imaginative states in this spectrum differ only in degree, not in kind. (1) In Speculations on Metaphysics, Shelley claims that: Thoughts, or ideas, or notions ... differ from each other, not in kind, but in force. It has commonly been supposed that those distinct thoughts ... which are called real ... are totally different in kind from those ... such as hallucinations, dreams and the ideas of madness. No essential distinction between any one of these ideas, or any class of them, is founded on a correct observation of the nature of things. (59-60) Shelley here claims a similar cognitive process for dreams and hallucinations as for thoughts or ideas, varying only in the degree to which the waking reason has control over the imaginative state. Though they differ in degree or force, they are similar in kind because in each the mind imagines a mental image. A vision in the mind was at the heart of all of these states because the imagination was, in essence, the image-making faculty. From the time of Aristotle one of the primary roles of the imagination was to create and store images within the mind. As Alexander Schlutz explains in Mind's World: Imagination and Subjectivity from Descartes to Romanticism, for Aristotle the role of the \"phantasia\" (which would later become the imagination) was to allow a mediation between aesthesis (sense-perception) and dianoia (discursive thought). …","PeriodicalId":390916,"journal":{"name":"Studies in the Literary Imagination","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Visions in Verse: Writing the Visual in Romantic Dream Visions\",\"authors\":\"A. O'connell\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/SLI.2015.0003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Immanuel Kant's Anthropology the criterion for distinguishing dreams from reality is rational communication (Schlutz 113). 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Some of the best-known Romantic dream visions, among them Samuel Taylor Coleridge's \\\"Kubla Khan,\\\" John Keats's The Fall of Hyperion, and Percy Bysshe Shelley's The Triumph of Life, as discussed here, attempt to take up this challenge and seek to communicate the inspired visions that lie at the heart of the original creative idea. In The Fall of Hyperion, Keats embraces this role for the poet, claiming \\\"poesy alone can tell her dreams\\\" (8). However, like many Romantic dream visions that reflect on their own creation, the poem is keenly aware of one crucial problem inherent in this process: language. Before the twentieth century, ideas, thoughts, and inspired moments were all thought to be visual, not linguistic. To take creative ideas from the imaginative mind and communicate them with the world through poetry involved a transformation from the visual to the linguistic, from visions into verse. In the Romantic period the creative vision in the mind could refer to the inner experience of any of a range of imaginative states, from thoughts and ideas to the vision that is imagined when reading, composing poetry, daydreaming, in reverie, madness, or sleeping dreams. This is what Alan Richardson refers to in \\\"Reimagining the Romantic Imagination,\\\" borrowing neuroscience's current terminology, as \\\"the default mode.\\\" For Richardson, memory, prospective \\\"future thinking,\\\" daydreaming, nocturnal dreaming, and theory of mind or mind reading are linked in Romantic brain science as what scientists might now call defaulting, but which was understood in the Romantic period as various ways of imagining (389). When Romantic poets explore these states of mind, they understand them as a spectrum of liminal imaginative states. Shelley and Coleridge both argue that the imaginative states in this spectrum differ only in degree, not in kind. (1) In Speculations on Metaphysics, Shelley claims that: Thoughts, or ideas, or notions ... differ from each other, not in kind, but in force. It has commonly been supposed that those distinct thoughts ... which are called real ... are totally different in kind from those ... such as hallucinations, dreams and the ideas of madness. No essential distinction between any one of these ideas, or any class of them, is founded on a correct observation of the nature of things. (59-60) Shelley here claims a similar cognitive process for dreams and hallucinations as for thoughts or ideas, varying only in the degree to which the waking reason has control over the imaginative state. Though they differ in degree or force, they are similar in kind because in each the mind imagines a mental image. A vision in the mind was at the heart of all of these states because the imagination was, in essence, the image-making faculty. 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引用次数: 1

摘要

在伊曼努尔·康德的人类学中,区分梦与现实的标准是理性交流(Schlutz 113)。康德引用赫拉克利特的名言:“当我们醒着的时候,我们有一个共同的世界,但当我们睡着的时候,我们每个人都有自己的世界。”康德认为,幻想的能力模糊了这种区别(康德,人类学63;参见Schlutz 113)。灵感和独创的天才是“不自觉的,因此像梦一样的幻想产物”(Schlutz 115,参见Kant 50-51)。对康德来说,灵感的诗歌和艺术在睡梦和清醒之间不安地坐着,因为它们从梦的世界中崛起,在清醒的世界中交流它们的愿景。对于浪漫主义诗人来说,艺术和诗歌也可以作为两个世界之间必不可少的桥梁,作为一种与外部世界交流创造性思维的梦想和愿景的手段。它们是外在世界的一种表现,表现的是梦的心灵在其他情况下的排他性状态。一些最著名的浪漫主义梦境,如塞缪尔·泰勒·柯勒律治的《忽必烈汗》、约翰·济慈的《亥伯龙的陨落》和珀西·比希·雪莱的《生命的胜利》,都试图接受这一挑战,并试图传达原始创意核心的灵感。在《亥伯龙的堕落》中,济慈接受了诗人的这一角色,声称“只有诗歌才能讲述她的梦想”(8)。然而,就像许多浪漫主义的梦境反映他们自己的创作一样,这首诗敏锐地意识到这个过程中固有的一个关键问题:语言。在20世纪之前,观念、思想和灵感时刻都被认为是视觉的,而不是语言的。从富有想象力的头脑中汲取创意,并通过诗歌与世界交流,涉及到从视觉到语言,从视觉到诗歌的转变。在浪漫主义时期,头脑中的创造性视觉可以指一系列想象状态中的任何一种内在体验,从思想和想法到阅读、写诗、做白日梦、幻想、疯狂或睡觉时想象的视觉。这就是艾伦·理查森在《重新想象浪漫的想象》中提到的,借用了神经科学的当前术语,称为“默认模式”。对理查森来说,记忆、前瞻性的“未来思考”、白日梦、夜间做梦、心灵理论或读心术在浪漫主义脑科学中被联系在一起,科学家们现在可能称之为默认,但在浪漫主义时期,这被理解为各种想象方式(389)。当浪漫主义诗人探索这些心理状态时,他们把它们理解为一种有限的想象状态的光谱。雪莱和柯勒律治都认为,在这个范围内的想象状态只是程度上的不同,而不是种类上的不同。(1)雪莱在《形而上学思辨》中宣称:思想,或观念,或观念……彼此不同,不是在种类上,而是在力量上。人们普遍认为,那些截然不同的想法……它们被称为真实的……完全不同于那些……比如幻觉、梦境和疯狂的想法。这些观念中的任何一种或任何一类的本质区别,都不是建立在对事物本质的正确观察之上的。(59-60)雪莱在这里声称,梦和幻觉的认知过程与思想或观念的认知过程类似,不同的只是清醒的理性对想象状态的控制程度。虽然它们在程度或力量上有所不同,但它们在种类上是相似的,因为每一种思维都在想象一种心理形象。头脑中的愿景是所有这些状态的核心,因为从本质上讲,想象力是一种塑造形象的能力。从亚里士多德时代起,想象力的主要作用之一就是在头脑中创造和储存图像。正如亚历山大·施卢茨在《心灵的世界:从笛卡尔到浪漫主义的想象与主体性》一书中所解释的那样,对于亚里士多德来说,“幻想”(后来成为想象)的作用是允许美学(感官知觉)和迪亚诺(话语思维)之间的调解。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Visions in Verse: Writing the Visual in Romantic Dream Visions
In Immanuel Kant's Anthropology the criterion for distinguishing dreams from reality is rational communication (Schlutz 113). Quoting Heraclitus's dictum, "when we are awake we have a world in common, but when we are asleep each has his own world," Kant argues that the faculty of fantasy blurs this distinction (Kant, Anthropology 63; see Schlutz 113). Inspiration and original genius are the "involuntary and hence dream-like products of fantasy" (Schlutz 115, see Kant 50-51). Inspired poetry and art sit uneasily, for Kant, between sleep and waking as they rise up out of the world of dreams to communicate their visions within the waking world. For Romantic poets, it follows that art and poetry could also act as an essential bridge between the two worlds, as a means of communicating the dreams and visions of the creative mind with the outside world. They were a representation for the outside world of what lies inside that otherwise exclusive state of the dreaming mind. Some of the best-known Romantic dream visions, among them Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Kubla Khan," John Keats's The Fall of Hyperion, and Percy Bysshe Shelley's The Triumph of Life, as discussed here, attempt to take up this challenge and seek to communicate the inspired visions that lie at the heart of the original creative idea. In The Fall of Hyperion, Keats embraces this role for the poet, claiming "poesy alone can tell her dreams" (8). However, like many Romantic dream visions that reflect on their own creation, the poem is keenly aware of one crucial problem inherent in this process: language. Before the twentieth century, ideas, thoughts, and inspired moments were all thought to be visual, not linguistic. To take creative ideas from the imaginative mind and communicate them with the world through poetry involved a transformation from the visual to the linguistic, from visions into verse. In the Romantic period the creative vision in the mind could refer to the inner experience of any of a range of imaginative states, from thoughts and ideas to the vision that is imagined when reading, composing poetry, daydreaming, in reverie, madness, or sleeping dreams. This is what Alan Richardson refers to in "Reimagining the Romantic Imagination," borrowing neuroscience's current terminology, as "the default mode." For Richardson, memory, prospective "future thinking," daydreaming, nocturnal dreaming, and theory of mind or mind reading are linked in Romantic brain science as what scientists might now call defaulting, but which was understood in the Romantic period as various ways of imagining (389). When Romantic poets explore these states of mind, they understand them as a spectrum of liminal imaginative states. Shelley and Coleridge both argue that the imaginative states in this spectrum differ only in degree, not in kind. (1) In Speculations on Metaphysics, Shelley claims that: Thoughts, or ideas, or notions ... differ from each other, not in kind, but in force. It has commonly been supposed that those distinct thoughts ... which are called real ... are totally different in kind from those ... such as hallucinations, dreams and the ideas of madness. No essential distinction between any one of these ideas, or any class of them, is founded on a correct observation of the nature of things. (59-60) Shelley here claims a similar cognitive process for dreams and hallucinations as for thoughts or ideas, varying only in the degree to which the waking reason has control over the imaginative state. Though they differ in degree or force, they are similar in kind because in each the mind imagines a mental image. A vision in the mind was at the heart of all of these states because the imagination was, in essence, the image-making faculty. From the time of Aristotle one of the primary roles of the imagination was to create and store images within the mind. As Alexander Schlutz explains in Mind's World: Imagination and Subjectivity from Descartes to Romanticism, for Aristotle the role of the "phantasia" (which would later become the imagination) was to allow a mediation between aesthesis (sense-perception) and dianoia (discursive thought). …
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