{"title":"基于搜索的最优CEO薪酬:理论与实证","authors":"Melanie Cao, Rong Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1355502","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-toperformance sensitivity depends positively on a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.","PeriodicalId":369344,"journal":{"name":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","volume":"72 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"32","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence\",\"authors\":\"Melanie Cao, Rong Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1355502\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-toperformance sensitivity depends positively on a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.\",\"PeriodicalId\":369344,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)\",\"volume\":\"72 12 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-11-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"32\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1355502\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Finance Association Meetings (AFA)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1355502","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence
We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-toperformance sensitivity depends positively on a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.
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