{"title":"评估不存在:特拉华州法院与控制保费的斗争","authors":"W. Carney, Mark Heimendinger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.399762","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the holdings of the Delaware courts that a control premium must be added to the market value of shares in freeze-out transactions. It finds this result is not required by prior Delaware law. We argue that there is no control premium absent a current transaction in control, and that assumptions of control premia in freeze-outs are simply speculation. Awarding control premia provides a windfall gain for public shareholders, and is contrary to the treatment of public shareholders who receive publicly traded shares in other mergers.","PeriodicalId":106641,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Corporate & Takeover Law","volume":"s3-19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2003-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Appraising the Non-Existent: The Delaware Courts' Struggle with Control Premiums\",\"authors\":\"W. Carney, Mark Heimendinger\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.399762\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines the holdings of the Delaware courts that a control premium must be added to the market value of shares in freeze-out transactions. It finds this result is not required by prior Delaware law. We argue that there is no control premium absent a current transaction in control, and that assumptions of control premia in freeze-outs are simply speculation. Awarding control premia provides a windfall gain for public shareholders, and is contrary to the treatment of public shareholders who receive publicly traded shares in other mergers.\",\"PeriodicalId\":106641,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate & Takeover Law\",\"volume\":\"s3-19 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2003-06-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate & Takeover Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.399762\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Law: Corporate & Takeover Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.399762","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Appraising the Non-Existent: The Delaware Courts' Struggle with Control Premiums
This paper examines the holdings of the Delaware courts that a control premium must be added to the market value of shares in freeze-out transactions. It finds this result is not required by prior Delaware law. We argue that there is no control premium absent a current transaction in control, and that assumptions of control premia in freeze-outs are simply speculation. Awarding control premia provides a windfall gain for public shareholders, and is contrary to the treatment of public shareholders who receive publicly traded shares in other mergers.