民间定理神话背后的真相

Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science Pub Date : 2013-12-03 DOI:10.1145/2554797.2554847

Joseph Y. Halpern, R. Pass, Lior Seeman

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引用次数: 12

摘要

研究了重复博弈中ε-纳什均衡的计算问题。Borgs等人[2010]的早期研究表明，这个问题很难解决。我们表明，如果我们对他们的模型做一点改变——将参与者建模为保持状态的多项式时间图灵机(而不是无状态的多项式时间图灵机)——并做出一些标准的加密硬度假设(公钥加密的存在)，这个问题实际上可以在多项式时间内解决。

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The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem

We study the problem of computing an ε-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players as polynomial-time Turing machines that maintain state (rather than stateless polynomial-time Turing machines)---and make some standard cryptographic hardness assumptions (the existence of public key encryption), the problem can actually be solved in polynomial time.

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Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science

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