嵌入式物联网设备的Rootkit检测

R. Nagy, K. Németh, Dorottya Papp, L. Buttyán
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引用次数: 6

摘要

物联网系统容易受到网络攻击,包括用rootkit感染嵌入式物联网设备。rootkit是恶意软件,通常以更高的权限运行,这使得它们的检测具有挑战性。在本文中,我们解决了这一挑战:我们提出了一种针对嵌入式物联网设备的rootkit检测方法,该方法利用可信执行环境(TEE),该环境通常支持流行的物联网平台,如基于ARM的嵌入式板。TEE为我们的rootkit检测算法提供了一个隔离的环境,并防止rootkit干扰其执行,即使rootkit在物联网设备的不受信任部分具有root权限。我们的rootkit检测算法识别由rootkit对操作系统内核代码、系统程序和影响控制流的数据(例如,钩子系统调用)所做的修改,以及由rootkit在某些内核数据结构中创建的不一致(例如,负责处理进程相关信息的那些)。我们还提出了检测设备持久存储中的rootkit组件的算法。除了详细描述我们的方法和算法之外,我们还报告了一个原型实现以及对我们的设计和实现的评估,这是基于我们为此目的开发的rootkit测试我们的原型。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rootkit Detection on Embedded IoT Devices
IoT systems are subject to cyber attacks, including infecting embedded IoT devices with rootkits. Rootkits are malicious software that typically run with elevated privileges, which makes their detection challenging. In this paper, we address this challenge: we propose a rootkit detection approach for embedded IoT devices that takes advantage of a trusted execution environment (TEE), which is often supported on popular IoT platforms, such as ARM based embedded boards. The TEE provides an isolated environment for our rootkit detection algorithms, and prevents the rootkit from interfering with their execution even if the rootkit has root privileges on the untrusted part of the IoT device. Our rootkit detection algorithms identify modifications made by the rootkit to the code of the operating system kernel, to system programs, and to data influencing the control flow (e.g., hooking system calls), as well as inconsistencies created by the rootkit in certain kernel data structures (e.g., those responsible to handle process related information). We also propose algorithms to detect rootkit components in the persistent storage of the device. Besides describing our approach and algorithms in details, we also report on a prototype implementation and on the evaluation of our design and implementation, which is based on testing our prototype with rootkits that we developed for this purpose.
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