有效的解决方案,以减少DoS攻击对IP地址所有权证明在移动IPv6的影响

Kentaroh Toyoda, Yuta Kamiguchi, Shinichiro Inoue, I. Sasase
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在移动IPv6(MIPv6)协议中,移动节点MN (Mobile Node)与通信节点CN (Correspondent Node)通信时,无法证明被请求IP地址的所有权。如果恶意节点冒充受害者的IP地址,它可以劫持会话或将数据包转发到不存在的目的地或其他节点。目前,为了让MN证明自己的IP地址的所有权,可以考虑使用Feige-Fiat-Shamir (FFS)标识方案[1]。然而,有一个严重的问题。在此方案中,CN必须验证所有绑定更新请求,这将导致DoS(拒绝服务)攻击。本文提出了一种通过在一次交易中进行两次挑战来减轻DoS攻击影响的方法。我们使第一个挑战易于验证以排除恶意节点,而第二个挑战比第一个挑战要困难得多,以避免冒充。该方法通过验证第一次挑战,可以有效地排除没有正确IP地址的恶意节点。此外,通过两次挑战,我们的方案可以在相同计算量的情况下降低模拟的概率。计算机仿真结果表明,与之前的方案相比,该方案有效地降低了DoS攻击的影响和被冒充的概率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Efficient solution to decrease the effect of DoS attack against IP address ownership proof in Mobile IPv6
In Mobile IPv6(MIPv6), a Mobile Node(MN) communicating with the Correspondent Node(CN) cannot prove the ownership of the claimed IP address. If a malicious node impersonates victim's IP address, it could hijack the session or forward packets to non-existing destination or other nodes. Currently, in order for a MN to prove the ownership of its own IP address, it is considered to use Feige-Fiat-Shamir (FFS) identification scheme [1]. However, there is one serious problem. In this scheme, a CN has to verify all of the Binding Update requests, and this leads to DoS(Denial of Service) attack. This paper shows a method which mitigates the effect of the DoS attack by making the challenge twice in a transaction. We make the first challenge easily verified to exclude the malicious nodes and the second one much more difficult than the first one to avoid impersonation. This method can efficiently exclude the malicious nodes which do not have proper IP addresses by verifying the first challenge. Furthermore, by making the challenge twice, our scheme can decrease the probability of impersonation over the previous scheme for equivalent calculation amount. By the computer simulation, we show that the proposed scheme is efficient to decrease the effect of the DoS attack and the probability of impersonation compared to the previous scheme.
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