硬件限制下的RSA签名

M. Joye, Yan Michalevsky
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们希望在硬件安全模块(HSM)的帮助下计算RSA签名。但是,当我们想要使用HSM不允许或不支持的某个公共指数时,我们该怎么办呢?令人惊讶的是,这种情况出现在现实世界的设置中,例如英特尔SGX飞地的代码签名。为了在发布模式下执行,必须对Intel SGX enclave进行签名,使用具有特定公共指数的3072位RSA签名方案。但是,我们遇到商业硬件安全模块不支持存储与该指数对应的RSA密钥。我们问是否有可能克服高速切削机床的这种限制,并给出肯定的回答(在陈述的假设下)。我们将展示如何将一个公共指数对应的RSA签名转换为另一个指数对应的有效RSA签名。我们定义了安全性,并表明它不会受到攻击者在此设置中可用的额外公共知识的损害。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
RSA Signatures Under Hardware Restrictions
We would like to compute RSA signatures with the help of a Hardware Security Module (HSM). But what can we do when we want to use a certain public exponent that the HSM does not allow or support? Surprisingly, this scenario comes up in real-world settings such as code-signing of Intel SGX enclaves. Intel SGX enclaves have to be signed in order to execute in release mode, using 3072-bit RSA signature scheme with a particular public exponent. However, we encountered commercial hardware security modules that do not support storing RSA keys corresponding to this exponent. We ask whether it is possible to overcome such a limitation of an HSM and answer it in the affirmative (under stated assumptions). We show how to convert RSA signatures corresponding to one public exponent, to valid RSA signatures corresponding to another exponent. We define security and show that it is not compromised by the additional public knowledge available to an adversary in this setting.
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