机器Learninģ-based以锁定盾牌网络防御演习为重点的C&C通道检测

Nicolas Känzig, Roland Meier, L. Gambazzi, Vincent Lenders, L. Vanbever
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引用次数: 6

摘要

企业网络中应用程序和设备的多样性以及庞大的流量使得快速识别恶意流量具有挑战性。当事件发生时,应急响应团队通常会在对网络拓扑和配置进行逆向工程时浪费宝贵的时间,然后才能专注于恶意活动和数字取证。在本文中,我们提出了一个系统,可以快速可靠地识别指挥和控制(C&C)通道,而不需要事先的网络知识。关键思想是使用过去发生的攻击的网络流量来训练分类器,并使用它来识别其他网络当前流量中的C&C连接。具体来说,我们利用了这样一个事实,即良性流量不同,恶意流量跨网络具有相似性(例如,参与僵尸网络行为的设备无论其位置如何,都以类似的方式进行)。为了确保性能和可扩展性,我们使用基于一组计算效率高的特征的随机森林分类器来检测C&C流量。为了防止攻击者欺骗我们的分类器,我们调整模型参数以最大化鲁棒性。我们测量了针对可能的攻击(例如,试图将C&C流伪装成良性流量)和推断期间的数据包丢失的高弹性。我们已经实施了我们的方法,并在一个真实用例中展示了它的实用性:锁定盾牌,世界上最大的网络防御演习。在《Locked shield》中,防御者只有有限的资源来保护大型异构网络免受未知攻击。使用来自参与团队的记录数据集(来自2017年和2018年),我们表明我们的分类器能够在接近实时的情况下以99%的精度和90%以上的召回率识别C&C通道,并满足实际的资源需求。如果该团队在2018年使用我们的系统,它将在演习的第一个小时内发现12个C&C服务器中的10个。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Machine Learninģ-based Detection of C&C Channels with a Focus on the Locked Shields Cyber Defense Exercise
The diversity of applications and devices in enterprise networks combined with large traffic volumes make it inherently challenging to quickly identify malicious traffic. When incidents occur, emergency response teams often lose precious time in reverse-engineering the network topology and configuration before they can focus on malicious activities and digital forensics. In this paper, we present a system that quickly and reliably identifies Command and Control (C&C) channels without prior network knowledge. The key idea is to train a classifier using network traffic from attacks that happened in the past and use it to identify C&C connections in the current traffic of other networks. Specifically, we leverage the fact that - while benign traffic differs - malicious traffic bears similarities across networks (e.g., devices participating in a botnet act in a similar manner irrespective of their location). To ensure performance and scalability, we use a random forest classifier based on a set of computationally-efficient features tailored to the detection of C&C traffic. In order to prevent attackers from outwitting our classifier, we tune the model parameters to maximize robustness. We measure high resilience against possible attacks - e.g., attempts to camouflaging C&C flows as benign traffic - and packet loss during the inference. We have implemented our approach and we show its practicality on a real use case: Locked Shields, the world's largest cyber defense exercise. In Locked Shields, defenders have limited resources to protect a large, heterogeneous network against unknown attacks. Using recorded datasets (from 2017 and 2018) from a participating team, we show that our classifier is able to identify C&C channels with 99% precision and over 90% recall in near real time and with realistic resource requirements. If the team had used our system in 2018, it would have discovered 10 out of 12 C&C servers in the first hours of the exercise.
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