增加器官供应的复杂性

M. Gershun, J. Lantos
{"title":"增加器官供应的复杂性","authors":"M. Gershun, J. Lantos","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501755439.003.0013","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter investigates why the various matching and swapping arrangements are hard to implement, arguing it is difficult to schedule even one transplant in ways that are convenient for the donor and meet the needs of the recipient. The chapter analyses the difficulties of this complicated exchange, especially if there are two or more transplants. With such awareness, the chapter reviews the innovative program that was recently initiated at the University of California, Los Angeles Medical Center, which allows people to donate a kidney today in exchange for a voucher that a designated recipient can redeem for a kidney in the future if and when a kidney is needed. Even though the new and more complex elaboration of paired exchanges or vouchers increased the pool of people who can donate and increased the chances for people on transplant waiting lists to get an organ, the chapter explores how they begin to look more and more like markets. And, in most countries, markets in organs are illegal.","PeriodicalId":297467,"journal":{"name":"Kidney to Share","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Complexities of Increasing Organ Supply\",\"authors\":\"M. Gershun, J. Lantos\",\"doi\":\"10.7591/cornell/9781501755439.003.0013\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter investigates why the various matching and swapping arrangements are hard to implement, arguing it is difficult to schedule even one transplant in ways that are convenient for the donor and meet the needs of the recipient. The chapter analyses the difficulties of this complicated exchange, especially if there are two or more transplants. With such awareness, the chapter reviews the innovative program that was recently initiated at the University of California, Los Angeles Medical Center, which allows people to donate a kidney today in exchange for a voucher that a designated recipient can redeem for a kidney in the future if and when a kidney is needed. Even though the new and more complex elaboration of paired exchanges or vouchers increased the pool of people who can donate and increased the chances for people on transplant waiting lists to get an organ, the chapter explores how they begin to look more and more like markets. And, in most countries, markets in organs are illegal.\",\"PeriodicalId\":297467,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Kidney to Share\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-05-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Kidney to Share\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501755439.003.0013\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kidney to Share","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501755439.003.0013","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本章调查了各种匹配和交换安排难以实施的原因,认为很难安排一次移植,既方便捐赠者,又满足接受者的需要。这一章分析了这种复杂交换的困难,特别是如果有两个或更多的移植。有了这样的认识,本章回顾了加州大学洛杉矶医学中心最近发起的创新项目,该项目允许人们今天捐赠一个肾脏,以换取一张代金券,指定的接受者可以在未来需要肾脏时兑换一个肾脏。尽管配对交换或代金券的新和更复杂的阐述增加了可以捐赠器官的人数,并增加了移植等待名单上的人获得器官的机会,但本章探讨了它们如何开始变得越来越像市场。而且,在大多数国家,器官交易市场是非法的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Complexities of Increasing Organ Supply
This chapter investigates why the various matching and swapping arrangements are hard to implement, arguing it is difficult to schedule even one transplant in ways that are convenient for the donor and meet the needs of the recipient. The chapter analyses the difficulties of this complicated exchange, especially if there are two or more transplants. With such awareness, the chapter reviews the innovative program that was recently initiated at the University of California, Los Angeles Medical Center, which allows people to donate a kidney today in exchange for a voucher that a designated recipient can redeem for a kidney in the future if and when a kidney is needed. Even though the new and more complex elaboration of paired exchanges or vouchers increased the pool of people who can donate and increased the chances for people on transplant waiting lists to get an organ, the chapter explores how they begin to look more and more like markets. And, in most countries, markets in organs are illegal.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信