在线库存披露:消费者如何感知信息的影响

Tolga Aydinliyim, Michael S. Pangburn, E. Rabinovich
{"title":"在线库存披露:消费者如何感知信息的影响","authors":"Tolga Aydinliyim, Michael S. Pangburn, E. Rabinovich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2498154","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Given varied consumer perceptions of inventory information, online retailers' presentation of such information influences purchase behavior. We investigate an online retailer's optimal inventory disclosure policy assuming two distinct consumer segments: savvy (or, experienced) consumers, who can predict a retailer's stock levels (even when masked) and naive (or, inexperienced) consumers who rely on prior beliefs regarding (unknown, and hence stochastic) inventory. We analyze a two-period setting in which a retailer clears residual stock in the second period. By jointly and optimally addressing both inventory disclosure and pricing, a retailer can leverage heterogeneous consumers' sensitivity to stock-out risk and thus discourage strategic purchase deferrals. We find that inventory information masking and sharing tactics are optimal at high and low stocking levels, respectively. Even though the threshold structure of this optimal disclosure strategy is robust to the relative proportion of savvy and naive consumers, optimal retailer pro t changes substantially depending on market composition. We find that, if a suffi\u000eciently large savvy consumer segment exists, incorrectly assuming all consumers are naive may yield a substantial pro fit loss, even higher than the loss the retailer would have incurred by implementing an incorrect inventory disclosure strategy.","PeriodicalId":352351,"journal":{"name":"Baruch: Operations Management (Topic)","volume":"318 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Online Inventory Disclosure: The Impact of How Consumers Perceive Information\",\"authors\":\"Tolga Aydinliyim, Michael S. Pangburn, E. Rabinovich\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2498154\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Given varied consumer perceptions of inventory information, online retailers' presentation of such information influences purchase behavior. We investigate an online retailer's optimal inventory disclosure policy assuming two distinct consumer segments: savvy (or, experienced) consumers, who can predict a retailer's stock levels (even when masked) and naive (or, inexperienced) consumers who rely on prior beliefs regarding (unknown, and hence stochastic) inventory. We analyze a two-period setting in which a retailer clears residual stock in the second period. By jointly and optimally addressing both inventory disclosure and pricing, a retailer can leverage heterogeneous consumers' sensitivity to stock-out risk and thus discourage strategic purchase deferrals. We find that inventory information masking and sharing tactics are optimal at high and low stocking levels, respectively. Even though the threshold structure of this optimal disclosure strategy is robust to the relative proportion of savvy and naive consumers, optimal retailer pro t changes substantially depending on market composition. We find that, if a suffi\\u000eciently large savvy consumer segment exists, incorrectly assuming all consumers are naive may yield a substantial pro fit loss, even higher than the loss the retailer would have incurred by implementing an incorrect inventory disclosure strategy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":352351,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Baruch: Operations Management (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"318 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-07-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Baruch: Operations Management (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2498154\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Baruch: Operations Management (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2498154","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

鉴于消费者对库存信息的不同看法,在线零售商对这些信息的呈现会影响购买行为。我们研究了在线零售商的最优库存披露政策,假设两个不同的消费者群体:精明(或有经验)的消费者,他们可以预测零售商的库存水平(即使被蒙面)和天真(或没有经验)的消费者,他们依赖于关于(未知的,因此是随机的)库存的先验信念。我们分析了一个两周期的设置,其中零售商在第二个周期清理剩余库存。通过共同和最优地处理库存披露和定价,零售商可以利用异质性消费者对缺货风险的敏感性,从而阻止战略性的购买延期。我们发现库存信息掩蔽和共享策略分别在高库存水平和低库存水平下是最优的。尽管这种最优披露策略的阈值结构对于精明和幼稚消费者的相对比例是稳健的,但最优零售商收益会根据市场构成发生实质性变化。我们发现,如果存在一个足够大的精明消费者群体,错误地假设所有消费者都是天真的,可能会产生巨大的利润损失,甚至比零售商实施不正确的库存披露策略所造成的损失还要高。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Online Inventory Disclosure: The Impact of How Consumers Perceive Information
Given varied consumer perceptions of inventory information, online retailers' presentation of such information influences purchase behavior. We investigate an online retailer's optimal inventory disclosure policy assuming two distinct consumer segments: savvy (or, experienced) consumers, who can predict a retailer's stock levels (even when masked) and naive (or, inexperienced) consumers who rely on prior beliefs regarding (unknown, and hence stochastic) inventory. We analyze a two-period setting in which a retailer clears residual stock in the second period. By jointly and optimally addressing both inventory disclosure and pricing, a retailer can leverage heterogeneous consumers' sensitivity to stock-out risk and thus discourage strategic purchase deferrals. We find that inventory information masking and sharing tactics are optimal at high and low stocking levels, respectively. Even though the threshold structure of this optimal disclosure strategy is robust to the relative proportion of savvy and naive consumers, optimal retailer pro t changes substantially depending on market composition. We find that, if a sufficiently large savvy consumer segment exists, incorrectly assuming all consumers are naive may yield a substantial pro fit loss, even higher than the loss the retailer would have incurred by implementing an incorrect inventory disclosure strategy.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信