竞争如何影响探索与开发?两个推荐算法的故事

Huining Henry Cao, Liye Ma, Z. Eddie Ning, Baohong Sun
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引用次数: 1

摘要

通过反复的互动,今天的公司不断完善他们对个人用户偏好的理解,以适应个性化。在本文中,我们使用连续时间强盗模型来分析向多址消费者推荐内容的公司,这是消费者偏好的战略学习以最大化终身价值的代表性设置。在垄断和双寡头垄断的情况下,我们比较了平衡探索和利用的前瞻性推荐算法和只最大化下一个推荐质量的短视算法。我们的分析表明,与垄断企业相比,争夺用户注意力的企业更注重开发而不是探索。当用户失去耐心时,竞争会降低开发前瞻性算法的回报。相比之下,前瞻性算法的开发在垄断下可能会伤害用户,但在竞争下却总是有利于用户。竞争公司投资前瞻性算法的决定可能会造成囚徒困境。我们的研究结果对人工智能的采用以及市场力量对创新和消费者福利的影响的政策制定者具有启示意义。这篇论文被市场部的Dmitri Kuksov接受。补充材料:在线附录可在https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4722上获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Does Competition Affect Exploration vs. Exploitation? A Tale of Two Recommendation Algorithms
Through repeated interactions, firms today refine their understanding of individual users’ preferences adaptively for personalization. In this paper, we use a continuous-time bandit model to analyze firms that recommend content to multihoming consumers, a representative setting for strategic learning of consumer preferences to maximize lifetime value. In both monopoly and duopoly settings, we compare a forward-looking recommendation algorithm that balances exploration and exploitation to a myopic algorithm that only maximizes the quality of the next recommendation. Our analysis shows that, compared with a monopoly, firms competing for users’ attention focus more on exploitation than exploration. When users are impatient, competition decreases the return from developing a forward-looking algorithm. In contrast, development of a forward-looking algorithm may hurt users under monopoly but always benefits users under competition. Competing firms’ decisions to invest in a forward-looking algorithm can create a prisoner’s dilemma. Our results have implications for artificial intelligence adoption and for policy makers on the effect of market power on innovation and consumer welfare. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4722 .
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