{"title":"Bowerbirds’ Mate-Selection Contests","authors":"Bharat Goel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3394772","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the world of satin bowerbirds, the male-birds engage in a contest among themselves to win their mates: they spend considerable time and effort in decorating their own bowers, and then attempt to destroy the decorations of their rivals’ bowers. The female-birds, in turn, select their mates on the basis of the attractiveness of the best surviving bowers. We study a game-theoretic model of such a mating contest, where two male-birds of distinct strengths engage in competitive signaling with value-less signals followed by signal sabotage (in an environment where a female-bird infers a male-bird’s strength by observing the quality of his surviving bower). We prove that sabotage possibilities can improve the outcomes for both male-birds – since anticipated threat of sabotage depresses each male-bird’s incentive to engage in costly signaling, while harming the outcome for the female-bird – as sabotage introduces noise in the female-bird’s selection process.","PeriodicalId":300059,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Max Planck Institute for Tax Law & Public Finance Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394772","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In the world of satin bowerbirds, the male-birds engage in a contest among themselves to win their mates: they spend considerable time and effort in decorating their own bowers, and then attempt to destroy the decorations of their rivals’ bowers. The female-birds, in turn, select their mates on the basis of the attractiveness of the best surviving bowers. We study a game-theoretic model of such a mating contest, where two male-birds of distinct strengths engage in competitive signaling with value-less signals followed by signal sabotage (in an environment where a female-bird infers a male-bird’s strength by observing the quality of his surviving bower). We prove that sabotage possibilities can improve the outcomes for both male-birds – since anticipated threat of sabotage depresses each male-bird’s incentive to engage in costly signaling, while harming the outcome for the female-bird – as sabotage introduces noise in the female-bird’s selection process.