{"title":"胡萝卜:高管薪酬、冒险和创新","authors":"Arnav Sheth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2632958","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Managers of firms with excess cash tend to misuse it. We extend the Radner-Shepp- Shiryaev framework, to create an incentive mechanism (the ‘carrot’) to motivate managers to pay out the cash instead. The problem cannot be solved in closed- form, and we devise a numerical technique to solve it. We find two main counter intuitive results: First, our mechanism results in higher firm value, and the greatest value goes to firms that are mid-level in their innovation. Second, we find that our mechanism increases risk-taking and interestingly, this is optimal to firm value maximization.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Carrot: Executive Compensation, Risk-Taking and Innovation\",\"authors\":\"Arnav Sheth\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2632958\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Managers of firms with excess cash tend to misuse it. We extend the Radner-Shepp- Shiryaev framework, to create an incentive mechanism (the ‘carrot’) to motivate managers to pay out the cash instead. The problem cannot be solved in closed- form, and we devise a numerical technique to solve it. We find two main counter intuitive results: First, our mechanism results in higher firm value, and the greatest value goes to firms that are mid-level in their innovation. Second, we find that our mechanism increases risk-taking and interestingly, this is optimal to firm value maximization.\",\"PeriodicalId\":228319,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-08-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2632958\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2632958","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Carrot: Executive Compensation, Risk-Taking and Innovation
Managers of firms with excess cash tend to misuse it. We extend the Radner-Shepp- Shiryaev framework, to create an incentive mechanism (the ‘carrot’) to motivate managers to pay out the cash instead. The problem cannot be solved in closed- form, and we devise a numerical technique to solve it. We find two main counter intuitive results: First, our mechanism results in higher firm value, and the greatest value goes to firms that are mid-level in their innovation. Second, we find that our mechanism increases risk-taking and interestingly, this is optimal to firm value maximization.