面向主机的SCADA系统网络安全方法

Jae-Myeong Lee, Sugwon Hong
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引用次数: 2

摘要

近年来针对监控与数据采集(SCADA)/工业控制系统(ICS)的网络攻击利用了主机系统软件环境的弱点,接管了车站网络主机进程的控制。我们分析了这些攻击的攻击路径,其特点是攻击如何劫持网络中的主机并危及现场设备控制器的操作。提出了一种基于主机的保护方法,可以防止恶意软件通过代码注入攻击渗透到进程内存中。该方法包括两种保护方案。一是防止基于文件的代码注入,如DLL注入。另一个是防止无文件代码注入。该方法跟踪内存区域中的变化,并确定新分配的内存是否使用恶意代码写入。对于这种方法,我们展示了如何采用机器学习方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Host-Oriented Approach to Cyber Security for the SCADA Systems
Recent cyberattacks targeting Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)/Industrial Control System(ICS) exploit weaknesses of host system software environment and take over the control of host processes in the host of the station network. We analyze the attack path of these attacks, which features how the attack hijacks the host in the network and compromises the operations of field device controllers. The paper proposes a host-based protection method, which can prevent malware penetration into the process memory by code injection attacks. The method consists of two protection schemes. One is to prevent file-based code injection such as DLL injection. The other is to prevent fileless code injection. The method traces changes in memory regions and determine whether the newly allocated memory is written with malicious codes. For this method, we show how a machine learning method can be adopted.
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