{"title":"不，它不是:对邪恶快乐法律的回应","authors":"Richard C Playford","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2018V17N1P1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I engage with Law's (2007) paper 'Evil Pleasure Is Good For You!' I argue that, although his criticism of hedonistic utilitarianism may hold some weight, his analysis of the goodness of pleasure is overly simplistic. I highlight some troubling results which would follow from his analysis and then outline a new account which then remedies these problems. Ultimately, I distinguish between Law's 'evil pleasures' and, what I call, 'virtuous pleasures' and show how we can accept the goodness of virtuous pleasures without being forced to say that evil pleasures are good for us.","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"No, It Isn’t: A Response to Law on Evil Pleasure\",\"authors\":\"Richard C Playford\",\"doi\":\"10.5007/1677-2954.2018V17N1P1\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, I engage with Law's (2007) paper 'Evil Pleasure Is Good For You!' I argue that, although his criticism of hedonistic utilitarianism may hold some weight, his analysis of the goodness of pleasure is overly simplistic. I highlight some troubling results which would follow from his analysis and then outline a new account which then remedies these problems. Ultimately, I distinguish between Law's 'evil pleasures' and, what I call, 'virtuous pleasures' and show how we can accept the goodness of virtuous pleasures without being forced to say that evil pleasures are good for us.\",\"PeriodicalId\":104826,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-10-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2018V17N1P1\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2018V17N1P1","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I engage with Law's (2007) paper 'Evil Pleasure Is Good For You!' I argue that, although his criticism of hedonistic utilitarianism may hold some weight, his analysis of the goodness of pleasure is overly simplistic. I highlight some troubling results which would follow from his analysis and then outline a new account which then remedies these problems. Ultimately, I distinguish between Law's 'evil pleasures' and, what I call, 'virtuous pleasures' and show how we can accept the goodness of virtuous pleasures without being forced to say that evil pleasures are good for us.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
